How program managers can use whistleblowing to reduce fraud within government organizations by Ernst, Brian A. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2014-09
How program managers can use whistleblowing to
reduce fraud within government organizations
Ernst, Brian A.












JOINT APPLIED PROJECT 
 
 
HOW PROGRAM MANAGERS CAN 
USE WHISTLEBLOWING TO 




By:      Brian A. Ernst,  
    Jeffrey J. Kubik, and  
    Angel F. Cruz 
September 2014 
 
Advisors: Brad Naegle 
Charles K. Pickar 
 
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Joint Applied Project 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
HOW PROGRAM MANAGERS CAN USE WHISTLEBLOWING TO REDUCE 
FRAUD WITHIN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Brian A. Ernst, Jeffery J. Kubik, Angel F. Cruz 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The objective of this project is to recommend how U.S. program managers can use whistleblowing policies to combat 
fraud within the Department of Defense. Whistleblowers are an underused asset for revealing hidden, immoral, 
fraudulent, or inappropriate actions within an organization. Not only may whistleblowing identify undetected 
problems, it may save lives and vast sums of money.  
This research project answers the following questions: 1) Why is whistleblowing important to a program-
management office and its chain of command? 2) What makes someone want to, or not want to, “blow the whistle” 
within their organization? 3) How can U.S. defense organizations position themselves to fully utilize the potential 
power of whistleblowing? 
The history of whistleblowing in the United States, its positive and negative impacts, and whistleblower decision-
making are discussed and an open-systems organizational model is used to demonstrate why a formal whistleblowing 
process is beneficial. Finally, recommendations are provided as to how organizations can create or strengthen their 







14. SUBJECT TERMS Whistleblowing, Whistleblowers Protection Act (WPA) 1989, The 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012, fraud, False Claims Act 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
101 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
HOW PROGRAM MANAGERS CAN USE WHISTLEBLOWING TO 
REDUCE FRAUD WITHIN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Brian A. Ernst, Civilian, Department of the Army 
Jeffrey J. Kubik, Civilian, Department of the Army 
Angel F. Cruz, Civilian, Department of the Army 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Authors:  Brian A. Ernst 
 
 
   Jeffery J. Kubik 
 
 
   Angel F. Cruz 
 
 
Approved by:             Brad Naegle 
 
 
Charles K. Pickar 
 
    
   William R. Gates, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 v
HOW PROGRAM MANAGERS CAN USE WHISTLEBLOWING TO 




The objective of this project is to recommend how U.S. program managers can use 
whistleblowing policies to combat fraud within the Department of Defense. 
Whistleblowers are an underused asset for revealing hidden, immoral, fraudulent, or 
inappropriate actions within an organization. Not only may whistleblowing identify 
undetected problems, it may save lives and vast sums of money.  
This research project answers the following questions: 1) Why is whistleblowing 
important to a program-management office and its chain of command? 2) What makes 
someone want to, or not want to, “blow the whistle” within their organization? 3) How 
can U.S. defense organizations position themselves to fully utilize the potential power of 
whistleblowing? 
The history of whistleblowing in the United States, its positive and negative 
impacts, and whistleblower decision-making are discussed and an open-systems 
organizational model is used to demonstrate why a formal whistleblowing process is 
beneficial. Finally, recommendations are provided as to how organizations can create or 
strengthen their whistleblowing polices.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. UNDERSTANDING FRAUD 
Fraud is a global plague to which no organization is immune. The world’s largest 
anti-fraud organization, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), estimates 
that a typical organization loses 5 percent of revenue each year to fraud (ACFE, 2014) 
(Ratley, 2014). When this percentage is applied to the 2013 estimated gross world 
product of $73.87 trillion, a projected fraud loss of nearly $3.7 trillion in 2014 (Ratley, 
2014) is revealed. 
Fraud cannot be entirely contained, and it continues to spread. The $3.7 trillion 
statistic above was estimated using data that was actually detected and reported. If every 
instance of fraud were reported, this estimate of loss would undoubtedly be much higher. 
The U.S. government is gravely concerned with fraud within its organizations. While 
acknowledging that fraud will never be eradicated, the U.S. seeks ways to improve fraud 
detection and thus reduce losses. 
To detect and prevent fraud, it is important to understand who is committing the 
offense and why. Utilizing poll results forensic experts in the U.S. categorize the general 
population into three groups: 20 percent who would never commit fraud, 60 percent who 
would if the chance of getting caught were low, and 20 percent whom seek ways to 
commit fraud regardless of the circumstances (Brooks & Dunn, 2010). It is a sobering 
notation that up to 80 percent of the U.S. population would commit fraud if given the 
right opportunity. Fraud opportunities are a critical part of the fraud-triangle model. 
The fraud-triangle model was developed from criminologist Donald R. Cressey’s 
hypothesis that,  
Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves 
as having a financial problem which is non-sharable, are aware this 
problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial 
trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation 
verbalizations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves 
as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves as users of the 
entrusted funds or property. (Cressey, 1973) 
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According to the fraud triangle, depicted in Figure 1, three factors must be present 
for an ordinary person to commit fraud: pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. 
 
Figure 1.  The Fraud Triangle (from Albrecht, 2014) 
The first side of the fraud triangle is pressure as a motivating factor. An 
individual might have a financial problem, such as unanticipated medical bills, or a 
perceived financial need, for instance, wanting to purchase something but lacking the 
means to do so. The motivation might also be nonfinancial—for example, high pressure 
to meet performance goals at work or cover up a coworker’s mistakes.  
Once this pressure is perceived as unbearable, the soon-to-be perpetrator begins to 
rationalize the contemplated fraud. Rationalization is the second side of the triangle. The 
individual may see himself as an ordinary, honest person who is merely among the 60 
percent who are caught in a bad set of circumstances. The potential fraudster finds it 
necessary to mentally justify the crime as an acceptable or defensible act.  
The final side of the triangle is the opportunity to commit fraud—access to assets 
and information that the employee can use both to commit and conceal the fraud. 
Opportunity can be created by weak internal controls or poor managerial oversight. The 
fraud-bent individual must see a way to use his position of trust to alleviate personal 
pressure and assess a low risk of being discovered. Almost three quarters (73 percent) of 
respondents to the 2014 PwC Global Economic Crime Survey indicated that the 
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opportunity or ability to commit a crime was the most important factor in the crime’s 
execution by an internally placed fraudster (Skalak, 2014). 
An organization has significantly more control over the opportunity side of  
the fraud triangle than over pressure and rationalization. The organization can mitigate 
the risk of fraud by reducing opportunities by means of internal policies, processes, and 
controls. A key resource that program managers can promote is whistleblowers  
(Cressey, 1973). 
B. WHISTLEBLOWING  
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a whistleblower is one “who 
reveals something covert or who informs against another.”  The U.S. Office of Special 
Counsel (U.S. Office of Special Counsel, 2014) describes five types of fraud or 
wrongdoing: 
1. Violation of a law, rule, or regulation 
2. Gross mismanagement 
3. Gross waste of funds 
4. Abuse of authority 
5. Substantial and specific danger to public health or safety  
A whistleblower is generally an employee of a private or public institution who is 
on the lookout for individuals (especially those in supervision or authority) who are doing 
wrong. Often a whistleblower simply happens to be in the right place at the right time to 
witness a wrongdoing perpetrated upon a company, institution, or the public good. The 
list of prominent American whistleblowers includes the following:  
 Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked a top-secret Pentagon study of U.S. 
government decision-making in relation to the Vietnam War to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
and 17 other newspapers. Ellsberg was tried under the Espionage Act 
(Lemann, 2002). 
 Gregory Hicks, a state-department employee and former deputy chief of 
mission in Libya who testified before Congress about attacks on an 
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American diplomatic facility in Benghazi. Hicks was subsequently 
demoted from his position (Zornick, 2013). 
 Sherron Watkins, an Enron Corporation vice-president who exposed one 
of the largest accounting frauds in history. Watkins feared for her safety 
while being bounced from job to job within Enron and endured threats of 
dismissal (Pasha, 2006). 
 Kendall Dye, an Alliant Techsystems program manager who uncovered 
testing shortfalls in a military flare program and jeopardized a 21-year 
career by preventing his company from knowingly delivering unsafe 
products to the U.S. government (Glater, 2008) 
This research focuses on what program managers and other leaders within an 
organization can do to strengthen whistleblowing policies. Whistleblowing happens when 
an individual reports or discovers evidence of a wrongdoing. The critical questions for 
those seeking to encourage reporting of the offense are as follows: 
 What motivates an individual to blow the whistle?  
 What are their incentives, disincentives, and ethical and moral dilemmas 
when deciding to report?   
 Is the organizational culture promoted by the program manager conducive 
to whistleblowing?   
 Will others in the organization react favorably or unfavorably to the 
whistleblower?   
Too often, U.S. defense organizations view whistleblowers in a defensive and 
negative light. This research project explores what organizations can do to reverse this 
perception and make whistleblowing work for them through sound policy. In developing 
a whistleblower policy, program managers must look at organizational structures, culture, 
processes, and above all, human nature. A policy that facilitates whistleblowing can help 
employees and organizations better align their responses to wrongdoing, to yield a better 
place to work and build a stronger institution overall.  Finally, this research provides 
recommendations on how to design and implement whistleblowing policies within an 
organization. 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Two major phenomena were explored in the conduct of this research: first, the act 
of whistleblowing itself. What leads an individual to blow the whistle?  Does the 
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whistleblower generally realize the full implications of his actions?  Did his 
whistleblowing have any impact on himself or the organization?  Second, from a program 
manager’s perspective, what framework can be devised to utilize the information 
provided by whistleblowers? The PM’s organization must have proper structures, 
processes, and cultural factors in place to allow the development of policy and create a 
context for whistleblowing. Employees and management within the program-
management office must share a common view of wrongdoing, agree on what constitutes 
blowing the whistle, and ensure appropriate reporting mechanisms are in place. When 
employees and management agree, program managers are in a better position to reduce 
waste and corruption, employee input is affirmed, and the entire organization can expect 
to grow stronger and more effective overall. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
This study addresses the following questions: 
1. Why is whistleblowing important to a program-management office and its 
chain of command? 
2. What makes a person want to—or decline to—blow the whistle within his 
organization? 
3. How can U.S. defense organizations develop policies to capitalize on the 
potential benefits of whistleblowing? 
Answers to these questions were sought by reviewing a large literature on fraud 
and whistleblowing, consisting of case studies, articles, websites, and books. From the 
many broad topics discussed, recommendations were distilled as to how organizations 
can use whistleblowers to improve their fraud controls. Chapter II of this report explores 
the development of whistleblowing policies and reforms. Chapter III focuses on fraud 
detection through whistleblowing. The whistleblowing decision-making process is 
presented in Chapter IV, including incentives and disincentives to employees and other 
personnel. Chapter V uses an open-system organizational model to analyze the impacts of 
an established whistleblowing policy, or lack thereof, and Chapter VI makes 
recommendations on how an effective whistleblowing policy may be implemented, 
including strategy and execution.  
 6
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF WHISTLEBLOWING POLICIES  
AND REFORMS 
Whenever individuals in places of power and decision see ways to achieve greater 
power, influence, or prosperity by their actions, it is human nature that some persons will 
be tempted to exploit the situation. It is also human nature that whistleblowers sometimes 
arise to report an illegal or unethical act perpetrated upon a company, stockholders, or, in 
the case of governmental abuse, the people. When whistleblowers act, those who have 
committed the illegal or unethical deed often seek to retaliate, and may have resources to 
do so.  
A. THE FIRST KNOWN WHISTLEBLOWERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
In 1777, just outside of Providence, Rhode Island, ten sailors, under the direct 
command of the commander in chief of the Continental Navy, Commodore Esek Hopkins 
(Kohn, 2011) sent a petition to the U.S. Congress alleging misconduct by Commodore 
Hopkins. The men stated that their commander could no longer lead them due to 
questionable decisions, including failing to attack a British frigate that had run aground, 
permitting the enemy to escape, and treating prisoners in a cruel and inhumane manner 
(Kohn, 2011). The Continental Congress and its president, John Hancock, investigated 
the accusations, found them true, and suspended Commodore Hopkins, eventually 
relieving him of his duties. At the time, Hopkins was America’s highest-ranking naval 
officer and the U.S. was waging a war.  
The exposure of this decommissioned officer came at a price. Commodore 
Hopkins publically humiliated two of the sailors by parading them before a mock trial 
and relieving the “ringleader” of his duties. Thus, the first recorded whistleblower in U.S. 
history suffered retaliation (Kohn, 2011).  
Fearing further reprisals, the sailors asked Congress for protection. They received 
free legal representation, along with payments for court costs and attorney fees. The first 
Congress “understood that finding whistleblowers guilty of criminal libel was counter to 
the framework of the new Republic” (Kohn, 2011, p. 199); however, no whistleblower 
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protection law was enacted at that time. Before the term was coined or any laws on the 
topic were drafted, these sailors showed the important role whistleblowers would have in 
the newly formed country.   
B. THE FALSE-CLAIMS ACT 
The False-Claims Act (FCA), or Lincoln Law, of 1863 was the predecessor to the 
modern basis of whistleblower law, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989. 
Learning of unscrupulous defense contractors who were trying to profit unfairly during 
the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln won the right for citizens to serve as 
government enforcers through false-claims lawsuits (Devine, 2011). The purpose of the 
act was to discover anti-government fraud and encourage cognizant citizens to provide 
information.  (History of the False-Claims Act, 2013). Whistleblower provisions allowed 
private parties to sue companies and individuals on behalf of the government and allowed 
them to collect up to 50 percent of monies recovered. The FCA remained virtually 
unchanged until 1943, when, responding to pressure from large defense contractors 
during WWII, lawmakers cut the potential award size, thus removing a powerful 
incentive to inform. 
C. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT (1989) 
Many post-war events led to the strengthening of whistleblower-protection laws. 
Perhaps the most influential were the Watergate scandal in the 1970s and increased 
military fraud, waste, and abuse in the 1980s, during the Cold War. President Ronald 
Reagan formed the Packard Commission to investigate defense-contractor fraud, with its 
tales of $400 hammers and $600 toilet seats (Kurland, 1993). In 1985, a Department of 
Defense report stated that 45 of the largest hundred defense contractors, including nine of 
the top ten, were under investigation for multiple fraud offenses (Defense Procurement 
Fraud, 1985). Because employees hesitated to speak up due to fear of reprisals, it was 
difficult for the Justice Department to bring perpetrators to account. Employees were 
reasonably afraid of losing their jobs for reporting fraud and abuse. To clean up the 
defense landscape, two senators, Charles Grassley (R–IA) and Howard Berman (D–CA), 
sponsored a 1986 amendment that strengthened the False-Claims Act (Devine, 2011) by 
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providing greater monetary incentives for whistleblowers to come forward and creating 
monetary and other incentives for private attorneys to independently investigate fraud. 
Before this amendment, civil-fraud recoveries averaged between $6M–$9M per year. 
Starting in 1986 and for the next 21 years, recoveries totaled nearly $24 billion—a 
staggering increase. In 2009 alone, false-claims lawsuits led to $5.6 billion in recoveries 
(Devine, 2011). Most importantly, the adversarial perception of whistleblowers was 
turning, and government organizations and corporations began to spend substantial sums 
on meaningful compliance programs (Devine, 2011). 
Despite this amendment, whistleblowers remained vulnerable to retaliation. By 
reporting illegal or unethical behavior, a whistleblower could be demoted, fired, or, in 
extreme cases, imprisoned. Following the strengthening of the FCA, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989 for federal employees who 
made disclosures of illegal or improper government activities. The protections of the 
WPA covered most executive-branch employees if a negative personnel action was made 
against them due to a disclosure (Whitaker, 2007). A federal agency is in violation of the 
WPA if authorities take or threaten retaliatory personnel action against any employee 
because of information disclosed. Under the WPA, whistleblowers may file complaints 
alleging violation of a law, rule or regulation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of 
funds; abuse of authority; or substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 
D. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION-ENHANCEMENT ACT   (2012)  
After the WPA was enacted in 1989, legislators continued to look for ways to 
improve the law and increase its scope. Congress made several attempts before passing 
the Whistleblower Protection-Enhancement Act (WPEA) in 2012. Its three broad 
provisions are as follows: 
 Expanded protection for disclosures of government wrongdoing 
 Expanded coverage and fair processes 
 Enhanced education and understanding concerning whistleblower rights 
The new law closed judicially created loopholes that had removed protections for 
the most common whistleblowing scenarios and left only token rights. The law also 
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expanded coverage of employees to include those from the Transportation Security 
Administration (Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 2012) and 
protected government scientists who challenged censorship (Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 2012, 2012). The WPEA overturned the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (MSPB) practice that allowed agencies to present a defense first in some cases and 
allowed the MSPB to make a ruling before hearing evidence of retaliation 
(Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 2012).  This was significant in that 
whistleblowers had to present any claim of retaliation before the MSPB and prove that 
their actions had resulted in derogatory personnel actions. If a whistleblower lost his case 
before the MSPB, his recourse was an appeal before the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which had sole jurisdiction on review. The WPEA suspended this procedure 
(Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 2012) under which, according to 
Devine, Devine, and Blaylock, the court ruled against whistleblowers 226 of 229 times  
(a rate of 98.7 percent) from October 1994–May 2012 (2012). 
E. OTHER WHISTLEBLOWER REFORMS 
The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, also known as the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, provided sweeping reforms in the way that public disclosures are 
made and accounted for by publicly held corporations under federal securities laws 
(Watnick, 2007). Bumgardner (2003) noted that Congress rushed to pass this complicated 
law in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom corporate scandals. Section 401 of the 
legislation encourages employees, directors, and supervisors in the corporate world to 
look for and report fraud within their companies. Along with this encouragement came 
other significant protections. A problem with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, however, is that 
whistleblower cases, which are meant to be adjudicated quickly, are often stalled far 
beyond the maximal period mandated (Watnick, 2007).  
Sarbanes–Oxley allows for an employee who has been retaliated against to be 
reinstated in his previous position if he can show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
1) he engaged in protected activity under Sarbanes–Oxley, 2) that his employer was 
aware of this activity, 3) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and 4) that the 
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protected activity was likely a contributing factor in the employer’s decision to take 
adverse action (Watnick, 2007). The Sarbanes–Oxley Act did not go far enough, 
however, since whistleblowers found it difficult to obtain protection and relief (King, 
2011). This played out during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, with the housing bubble, 
sub-prime mortgages, outsized risks, and overleveraging occurring commonly (King, 
2011). During testimony in the felony fraud trial of Bernard Madoff, the Senate Banking 
Committee heard financial analysts advocate stronger whistleblower protections than 
those afforded under Sarbanes–Oxley. This led to the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (King, 2011). 
The purpose of Dodd–Frank was to restore public confidence in the financial 
system, prevent another crisis, and allow any future asset bubble to be detected and 
deflated before financial crisis ensued (Sweet, 2010). Dodd–Frank included a 
whistleblower program that allowed individuals reporting original information to the  
SEC that led to a recovery exceeding $1 million to obtain 10–30 percent of the recovery. 
The law also included a prohibition on retaliation (Dutta, 2012), by which a targeted 
individual has the right to reinstatement in his same position, twice the amount of back 
pay plus interest, and compensation for litigation costs, expert-witness fees, and 
reasonable attorney fees (15 USC § 78u–6 (h)(1)(C)). Given these penalties, it behooves 
organizations and corporations to install effective fraud-reporting policies so that internal 
problems can be resolved without federal-government involvement.  
To achieve effective fraud-reporting policies, organizations need to cultivate and 
communicate a culture in which the reporting of fraud is considered welcome and 
necessary. Leadership must understand the value of whistleblowing as not only curtailing 
a specific incidence of fraud, but as beneficially exposing the internal weaknesses that 
allow fraud to occur. Thus the government encourages all employees to blow the whistle, 
incentivizing them by offering monetary rewards for their service. 
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III. FRAUD DETECTION THROUGH WHISTLEBLOWING 
Well established, implemented, and controlled whistleblowing policies should be 
a key part of an organization’s internal checks and balances. Human beings are far from 
perfect in their behaviors. As the “I’m only human” excuse implies, some wrongdoing is 
unintentional—simple human mistakes that happen despite innocent motivations. In 
contrast is the deliberate misconduct of persons who intentionally break rules or laws for 
personal or corporate gain. This chapter examines historical and other data to suggest the 
necessity of implementing internal processes to reduce damage and loss from fraud. 
In the DoD, program managers (PMs) are required to operate under very specific 
rules. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides PMs with DoD-mandated 
policies and procedures for legally completing acquisitions. The DoD Inspector General 
enforces Instruction Number 7600.02, which lays out audit directions and policies that 
must be met to comply with DoD requirements. (IG DOD, 2007). Several Army 
regulations govern acquisition programs, chief of which is Army Regulation 70-1, the 
Army Acquisition Policy. This regulation is used to manage acquisition programs 
following statutory requirements, the FAR, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 
supplement, other DoD regulatory direction, and other Army federal-acquisition-
regulation supplements (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011).   
The FAR provides almost no guidance on fraud prevention and whistleblowing, 
stating only that contractors and subcontractors must observe regulations against 
discharging, demoting, or otherwise discriminating against an employee in reprisal for 
whistleblowing. The FAR also requires contractors to display fraud-hotline posters. 
The Inspector General (IG) instruction to PMs on audit policies provides thorough 
guidance on the who, what, why, and where of audit requirements.  Internal and external 
audits in 2013 accounted for 17.1 percent of the fraud examined by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (Ratley, 2014). However, echoing the FAR, IG documents 
provide no guidance on how to leverage a highly effective and low-cost resource to 
combat fraud—namely, whistleblowers. 
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A. EFFECTIVE LEVERAGING OF QUI TAM PROVISIONS 
The provision in the FCA by which citizens may serve as government enforcers is 
known as qui tam, an abbreviation of the Latin for “he who sues in this matter for the 
king as well as for himself.” Qui tam is a unique legal mechanism that allows citizens 
with evidence of fraud against government contractors and programs to sue to return the 
stolen funds to the government (False, 2014). The government shares a portion of the 
recovered money with the party who filed charges. 
Under the FCA, in fiscal year 2013, the Department of Justice recovered  
$3.8 billion in direct fraud against the government (Brainin, 2013). Of that total,  
$2.9 billion was recovered directly due to whistleblowers (USDOJ, 2014). Although the 
total money recovered in 2013 was less than in the previous fiscal year, it was the 
second-highest total recovered in a single year. And while 2013 did not break the overall 
financial-recovery record, it did break the record for number of cases filed and for the 
amount of money recovered specifically under procurement-fraud suits ($887M). In 
2013, whistleblowers also played a large role in the filing of FCA lawsuits, with 753 of 
846 new cases initiated under qui tam provisions (Fraud, 2013). 
As shown in Figure 2, starting in FY1995, qui tam suits became the primary 
source of recovery information under the FCA. Figure 2 also shows that the FCA 
processes an increasing number of lawsuits each year, increasingly initiated by 
whistleblowers under the qui tam provision. 
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Figure 2.  Types of False-Claims Act Files (after Fraud, 2013) 
The overall historical success of the FCA is largely due to the 9,244 qui tam 
lawsuits that whistleblowers have filed since FY1987, when the FCA was amended. 
Overall, since 1987, whistleblower qui tam cases have led to more than $27.2 billion in 
government recoveries, with half of that amount ($13.5 billion) recovered in the past five 
years (Fraud, 2013).  
The fact that the FCA continues to set new records for money recovered and 
number of qui tam filings suggests that fraud against the government remains an active 
threat that needs to be deterred, exposed, and eliminated. 
B. INDEPENDENT SURVEY RESULTS 
The 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC), the world’s largest professional-services firm, included data from over 5,000 
respondents in 95 countries.  This survey confirmed the data presented earlier in relation 
to the FCA—massive economic crime is a fundamental fact of life for every segment of 
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PWC determined that fraud constitutes one of the biggest problems of 
organizations worldwide and that organizations cannot rely solely on fraud controls such 
as internal audits to deter, detect, and defeat fraud. Figure 3 provides PWC survey data 
indicating that fraud occurs within government more than within most of the private 
industrial base (Parton, 2009, 2011; Skalak, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.  Fraud Reported by the Type of Industry  
(after Parton, 2009, 2011; Skalak, 2014)  
The Ethics Resource Center (ERC) also provides data comparing fraud within 
government and industry. The ERC is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to 
independent research that advances ethical standards and practices in public and private 
institutions (Ethics, 2014). The ERC polled government employees to determine what 
percentage had observed fraud in the reporting year. As shown in Figure 4, the 
government employees witnessed the same or greater instances of fraud as compared to 

























Figure 4.  Fraud Witnessed within the Government and Private Business  
(after Harned, 2007) 
The ACFE’s 2014 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse 
reveals over 1,400 cases of occupational fraud, as reported by investigating certified 
fraud examiners. In the ACFE report, tips proved the most common method of exposing 
occupational fraud. Figure 5 shows tips as most effective method of fraud detection for 





























Figure 5.  Methods of Fraud Detection (after Ratley, 2014) 
Certified fraud examiners recognize that fraud, by its very nature, resists scientific 
observation and precise measurement. Fraudsters typically keep their actions secret from 
everyone not involved in the scheme; thus analysis is limited to fraud that has been 
detected and reported. For this reason having proactive whistleblowers who often work 
alongside the fraudster are essential to an effective anti-fraud program. As shown in 
Figure 6, the ACFE’s report found that 49 percent of fraud cases analyzed was reported 
by employees, a statistic significantly higher than the PricewaterhouseCoopers finding of 
23 percent (ACFE, 2014; Skalak, 2014). What both these data points show is that 
employees can provide a significant benefit to an organization’s fraud-control system. 
Thus employees should be encouraged to report illegal or suspicious behavior and 























Figure 6.  Source of Fraud Tips (after ACFE, 2014) 
In 2007, the Ethics Resource Center conducted a survey of 3,452 U.S. employees, 
774 of whom were federal employees (Hamed, 2007). The responses from federal 
employees were published as the National Government Ethics Survey. While the ERC 
subsequently published reports on private business ethics, no update on federal 
employees has been released. 
The ERC’s government survey mirrored those of PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners in concluding that organizations need effective 
whistleblowing policies to minimize fraud.  The ERC survey focused on ethics and 
misconduct, anticipating a rise in misconduct if deliberate action is not taken.  
The ERC study found that one in four government employees works in an 
environment conducive to misconduct (Hamed, 2007). Several problems are inherent in 
such environments, two of which relate directly to the fraud triangle: employees 
encounter opportunities to do wrong and typically feel pressure to commit dubious  
acts. Figure 7 shows that pressure to compromise standards in order to complete required 


















Figure 7.  Pressure to Compromise Work Standards (after Harned, 2007) 
Over half (52 percent) of federal employees polled by the ERC observed 
misconduct in their workplace, of which 25 percent chose not to report it (Harned, 2007). 
An employee failing to report misconduct creates a ripple effect that leaves management 
unaware of the problem, making it difficult to prevent further occurrences.  
The PricewaterhouseCoopers, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, and 
Ethics Resource Center studies confirm via global data spanning multiple years that 
whistleblowers can objectively help their organizations and that strong policies are 
needed to encourage whistleblowers to act. Whistleblowers may not only save the 
government millions of dollars, but the lives of innocent persons as well, as illustrated in 
the Alliant Techsystems case.   
C. ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS INC (ATK) CASE STUDY 
Kendall Dye placed his career in direct jeopardy for the welfare of others when  
he blew the whistle on his employer, ATK Launch Systems. ATK ultimately paid  
$36.9 million in cash and services to settle his suit (Foy, 2014) alleging reckless disregard 














 In 2005, Mr. Dye became the flare-program manager at ATK. Unlike the small 
flares used by commuters stranded on a highway, an ATK flare is a three-foot aluminum 
tube filled with thirty-six pounds of propellant that burns at more than 3,600°F (note that 
common steel melts at 2,500°F and aircraft aluminum melts at 1,250°F [Gagnon, 2011]) 
(Riley, 2012). Once ignited, a flare cannot be extinguished and must burn itself out. One 
method to deploy the flares is to release them from airplanes, attached to parachutes. The 
flares illuminate approximately a square mile of the ground below for several minutes. If 
one of these flares were to accidently ignite, it could easily set fire to its surroundings, 
setting off nearby ordnance, burning a hole in the steel hull of a ship, or melting through 
the aluminum skin of an airplane. 
The same year Mr. Dye became the flare-program manager, the Navy evaluated 
whether the flares could meet a more stringent four-foot-drop requirement versus the 
then-current requirement of surviving a ten-foot drop without igniting. The Navy found 
that the flares ignited at drop heights of forty, thirty, and twenty feet, but did not test them 
at ten feet. Mr. Dye initially thought the plastic igniter, which was designed to break 
when deployed, could be made more rugged to meet naval requirements. During his 
redesign of the plastic igniter, Mr. Dye discovered that the plastic igniter could break and 
cause ignition from a fall of just 11.5 inches. 
After sifting through old ATK records of the flare program, Mr. Dye learned that 
in the late 1990s, military buyers complained of the flares failing to ignite after 
deployment. ATK had a team of engineering students from a local university design an 
“improved” igniter. The student team came up with a system that used the force 
generated by the flare’s parachute opening to snap a thin piece of plastic, which activated 
the flare’s ignition. Mr. Dye found an email from the ATK test engineer assigned to 
evaluate the design that warned about a “more realistic scenario, which might present a 
significant hazard to equipment/personnel: If the flare assembly receives a significant 
impact (i.e., dropped) I can foresee” the plastic restraint in the igniter breaking, “resulting 
in complete ignition of the flare.” In his email, the test engineer recommended 
performing drop tests to gauge the safety of the flares with the new igniter design. ATK 
 22
started shipping the redesigned flares fitted with the plastic igniter, without testing, in 
2000 (Glater, 2008).  
Upon finding the test-engineer’s email, Mr. Dye notified his supervisor, who told 
him not to tell anybody—the issue would be handled internally. ATK formed a team to 
review the flare program and design, but blamed a third-party vendor for modifying the 
flares and did not focus on the student-redesigned element. ATK also sent a letter to its 
customers stating the flares may be more sensitive than specifications allowed if dropped. 
Mr. Dye did not see ATK take any steps to actually correct the issue, including 
fixing or replacing the flares that had already been delivered to the U.S. government, so 
he decided to blow the whistle through the FCA. In April 2012, ATK was ordered to pay 
$21 million to the government to settle Mr. Dye’s qui tam suit. ATK was also required to 
retrofit the 76,000 defective flares in government inventory.  
Fortunately, Kendall Dye was willing to jeopardize his 21-year career and expose 
the company’s knowing delivery of hazardous products before any accidents occurred 
(Glater, 2008).  
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IV. THE WHISTLEBLOWING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The whistleblower decision-making process is that by which an individual 
determines whether to report a wrongdoing in an organization. There are many factors in 
this decision, centering on incentives. This chapter explores the perceived incentives and 
disincentives of whistleblowing.      
A. INCENTIVES  
Deciding to blow the whistle begins with moral values and the individual’s ability 
to negotiate the difference between right and wrong.  Once a potential whistleblower 
takes a moral position, other incentives come into play. This section explores how  
the type of wrongdoing affects the decision-making process and rationale, discusses  
whether some types of wrongdoing are more likely to be reported, and evaluates several 
monetary-reward systems and legal protections currently in place.  
1. Moral Values 
Moral values play a large role in whistleblowing. Morality can be defined as a 
system of duties or rules between people with which both parties are required to comply 
(Robertson, 2010). Notice that this definition does not define what differentiates right 
from wrong. It essentially defines morality as a set of mandatory rules within a social 
structure. 
Interpretation as to what is right or wrong is subject to the development of moral 
values that are realized through an individual’s life experiences. Such realizations take 
place through socially established rules, policies, and procedures. It is assumed that moral 
values are not self-constructed, but rather correspond to a societal paradigm that is 
accepted and helps define judgments (Avakain & Roberts, 2011).     
Thus the morality of a whistleblower is defined in accordance with social and 
corporate rules, moral norms, and principles (Coady & Bloch, 1996). Conversely, an 
example of immoral organizational behavior is offering or accepting a bribe. If a 
government organization were to award a contract as a result of bribery, not only would 
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the corporate rules (laws) be broken, but the common principle of fairness as well. In this 
example, a potential whistleblower would likely have a moral problem with wrongdoing, 
but simply acknowledging that an action is immoral is not sufficient motivation for an 
individual to report the activities. Rather, it is only the first step in the decision-making 
process.   
Whistleblowers often display concern when a breach of moral values harms the 
welfare of others (Avakain & Roberts, 2011); indeed, concern for others is a common 
theme in nearly all the whistleblowing cases encountered in this research. It is inferred 
that seeking the wider social good beyond personal wellbeing plays into the typical 
whistleblower decision-making process and provides as an incentive to follow through. 
The ATK case study expresses this point. Upon becoming the flare-program manager, 
Mr. Dye learned that previously fielded flares were potentially hazardous to personnel 
and equipment. He felt that his company’s indifference to these findings was immoral, 
and, motivated by concern for users, blew the whistle. Even though the informer was not 
directly impacted by the wrongful act, concern for others provided a strong motivation.   
It is important to stress that the data does not suggest that “the welfare of others” 
is always a primary motivating factor—benefit to others may be no more than a 
byproduct. All organizations have stakeholders and parties with vested interests, and 
blowing the whistle on any illegitimate or immoral act will benefit some others in some 
way. In government organizations, the stakeholder is often identified as the taxpayer. If 
government waste is exposed in a whistleblower case, the taxpayer will benefit, but may 
not have been a factor in the whistleblower’s decision. 
A key aspect of the decision is an individual’s perception of duty and its 
importance in his moral system (Avakain & Roberts, 2011). Duty is a feeling of 
responsibility to uphold what is morally just in a person’s eyes—“The decision to act is 
driven by a personal concern that is based on values that uphold moral principles” 
(Avakain & Roberts, 2011, p. 77).  Avakain and Roberts explain that a whistleblower’s 
social concern does not develop at random, but is intertwined with a personal morality, 
which generates a sense of perceived duty.  An example is Cynthia Cooper, whom Time 
Magazine named among its “persons of the year” for 2002. Unearthing a $3.8 billion 
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accounting fraud at WorldCom, Cooper stated, “We don’t feel like we are heroes. I feel 
like I did my job” (Near et al., 2004, p. 219). This sentiment correlates with the sense of 
duty cited by Avakain and Roberts—Cooper felt it was her duty and responsibility to 
pursue what was morally right.            
The association between a given wrongful corporate act and the whistleblower’s 
morality is of the utmost importance in determining how the whistleblower interprets the 
act vis-à-vis the wider social good (Avakain & Roberts, 2011).  It is understood that 
morality plays a paramount role in decision-making, but are some types of wrongdoing 
more likely to be reported than others?   
2. Type of Wrongdoing Effects on the Whistleblowing Decision-Making 
Process 
Data was analyzed from a survey of employees of a large military base to assess 
possible differences in the whistleblowing decision based on the types of wrongdoing 
observed (Near et al., 2004). The findings, published in Business Ethics Quarterly in 
2004, analyzed types of wrongdoings and correlated reasons for not reporting, costs 
associated with the wrongdoing, quality of evidence, and anticipated retaliation. 
The survey looked at approximately 10,000 employees at a base in the United 
States. Roughly two-thirds were civilian; the other third were active military personnel. 
The base acquires high-tech aircraft and support systems, medical care, and base support, 
with budgets that run into the billions of dollars. The survey was sent to 9,900 employees, 
with a cover letter from the base commander requesting it be filled out anonymously. 
 A total of 3,288 employees completed and returned surveys to the researchers (about  
33 percent).   
Employees were asked if they had “personally observed or had direct evidence” 
of any wrongdoing identified in the survey within their organization in the last twelve 
months. Thirty-seven percent (1,224 employees) responded affirmatively. All other 
employees (those with negative responses) were excluded from further analysis. Those 
who observed wrongdoing were asked additional questions regarding the activities they 
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considered most serious or which had greatest impact on themselves personally (Near et 
al., 2004).   
The researchers grouped the wrongdoings identified into seven categories (Near et 
al., 2004) as defined below.   
 Stealing (10 percent of identified wrongdoings): Theft of federal funds, 
stealing of federal property, accepting bribes or kickbacks, use of official 
position for personal benefit, unfair advantage to a contractor, and 
employee abuse of office 
 Waste (44 percent): Waste by ineligible persons receiving benefits, by a 
badly managed program, or of organizational assets 
 Mismanagement (11 percent): Management cover-up of poor performance 
and false projections of performance 
 Safety Problems (8 percent): Management’s permitting unsafe or non-
compliant products and unsafe working conditions 
 Sexual Harassment (8 percent): Unwelcome sexual advances or requests 
for sexual favors and verbal or physical contact of a sexual nature 
 Discrimination (13 percent):  Any discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, etc. 
 Violation of Law (7 percent): Any legal violation  
The researchers asked those who observed offenses whether the incident was 
reported to an immediate supervisor, higher-level supervisor, higher-level agency official, 
agency inspector general, or any of several external channels. Of those who observed 
wrongdoing, 74 percent made no report. The remainder was asked if they had been 
identified as the source of a written, reported case. Of those who blew the whistle,  
77 percent were identified as the source, versus 23 percent who were kept anonymous.   
The researchers contacted those respondents who had not reported an observed 
wrongdoing and asked them to complete a checklist of several reasons they did not 
report. The possible answers were, it was not part of my job; I didn’t want to get 
coworker/supervisor in trouble; it was not serious enough; I wasn’t sure who to report to; 
it was already reported; nothing could be done; reporting was too risky; and nothing 
would be done (Near et al., 2004). 
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To probe whistleblower retaliation, the researchers targeted those 77 percent of 
the whistleblowers who were identified as the source of a report to see how many 
experienced retaliation. Thirty-seven percent reported some type of retaliation, as detailed 
later in this chapter (Near et al., 2004).   
Finally, the respondents were asked to describe the sequence of events 
surrounding the wrongdoing in question. Questions were made as the estimated costs 
associated with the wrongdoing, the frequency of occurrence, and the quality of evidence 
obtained in support of allegations. The cost question was framed as a range, since a 
specific dollar amount might be difficult to reasonably estimate. Thus, to the query, “if a 
dollar value can be placed on the activity, what was the amount involved,” the available 
responses were “less than $999” (coded “$500”), “$1,000-$100,000” (coded “$55,000”), 
or “more than $100,000” (coded “$100,000”). The mean of the costs coded was $34,759, 
with a standard deviation of $49,755.   
In some instances, such as sexual harassment, a dollar amount was not associated 
with the wrongdoing. The researchers therefore posed a second question, asking them to 
rate frequency of occurrence, as “once or rarely” (1), “occasionally” (2), or “frequently” 
(3). The mean score for frequency was 2.37, with a standard deviation of 0.93. 
The last rating requested concerned the quality of evidence in support of the 
wrongdoing claim. The options available were written, physical, observed by witnesses 
besides the respondent, convincing to the respondent, convincing to a majority of other 
observers, and convincing to others who had nothing to gain or lose from the 
wrongdoing.  
The researchers used chi-squared analysis to determine if differences in 
whistleblowing were significantly associated with a wrongdoing type. A chi-squared 
distribution is the sum of the squares of a set of normally distributed random variables. It 
is assumed the research team chose this method of analysis because the sum of random 
variables from any distribution can be closely approximated by a normal distribution, as 
the sum includes a greater and greater number of samples. Next, the team conducted an 
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analysis to assess whether wrongdoing type was significantly related to the conditions of 
the wrongdoing or to retaliation.   
a. Analysis of Whistleblowing Compared to Wrongdoing Type  
The data (Table 1) suggests that the type of wrongdoing committed was closely 
linked with whether witnesses actually blew the whistle. Legal violations were the most 
likely wrongdoing type to be reported—53 percent of those who observed legal violations 
reported the incident. Interestingly, legal violations were also the least observed of all 
wrongdoing types. Two other whistleblowing types stand out as being more likely to be 
reported: mismanagement (42.5 percent) and sexual harassment (40 percent).   
Exploring the other end of the spectrum, waste and unfair discrimination were the 
least reported wrongdoings observed. For both, only about 17 percent of all observers 
blew the whistle. Waste and discrimination ranked as the highest-observed wrongdoing 
types in this study. In sum, the two most-observed wrongdoings on the military base were 
the two least-likely types to be reported.   
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Table 1.   Chi-Square Analysis of Incidence of Whistleblowing, by Type of 
Wrongdoing (from Near et al., 2004) 





Type of Wrongdoing             
Stealing             
Count    88  29  117 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    75.2  24.8  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    9.7  9.3  9.6 
Waste             
Count    440  93  533 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    82.6  17.4  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    48.3  29.7  43.5 
Mismanagement             
Count    77  57  134 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    57.5  42.5  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    8.5  18.2  10.9 
Safety problems             
Count    77  23  100 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    77.0  23.0  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    8.5  7.3  8.2 
Sexual harassment             
Count    57  38  95 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    60.0  40.0  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    6.3  12.1  7.8 
Unfair discrimination             
Count    131  27  158 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    82.9  17.1  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    14.4  8.6  12.9 
Other legal violation             
Count    41  46  87 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    47.1  52.9  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    4.5  14.7  7.1 
Total             
Count    911  313  1224 
% within Type of Wrongdoing    74.4  25.6  100.0 
% within Type of Observer    100.0  100.0  100.0 
X^2 = 89.57, df = 6, p < .001                   
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b. Wrongdoing-Type Characteristic Comparative Analysis 
After collecting characteristics of each observed wrongdoing type, the researchers 
explored the cost associated with each, as presented in Table 2 (Table 6 in the source 
report). The mean cost of all observed wrongdoings was $34,759, with a standard 
deviation of $40,755. This indicates that large variances exist among the types of 
wrongdoings observed on the military base. Waste was identified as the most costly of all 
observed wrongdoings, with a mean cost of $46,694 per incident. Safety problems, with a 
mean cost of $36,280, were the second-highest cost reported (Near et al., 2004).   
The two wrongdoing types with the lowest reported associated costs were unfair 
discrimination and sexual harassment, with means of $6,673 and $12,826, respectively. 
This is not surprising, as these types of cost are difficult to associate with a dollar 
amount.   
To determine whether there was a statistical difference between a wrongdoing 
type and its associated cost, the research performed a post-hoc analysis using the Scheffe 
test (a method for adjusting significance levels in a linear-regression analysis to account 
for multiple comparisons). Their analysis indicated that waste was significantly higher in 
cost than stealing, mismanagement, sexual harassment, or discrimination. As stated 
above, waste has a higher mean cost per incident than safety problems and other legal 
violations, but the Scheffe test did not determine the differences to be statistically 
significant.   
The second characteristic captured was the quality of evidence obtained for each 
wrongdoing type. “Other legal violations” scored the highest overall (with a mean score 
of 2.81) and was shown to be significantly higher (using the Scheffe test) than stealing, 
waste, sexual harassment, and discrimination cases. Following close behind other legal 
violations were mismanagement (with a mean score of 2.30) and safety problems (mean 
score of 2.08) (Near et al., 2004).       
The researchers compared the sum of threatened and actual retaliation to the 
different types of wrongdoing. The only statistical significance was found in comparing 
other legal violations to waste. Whistleblowers on other legal violations faced a much 
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greater level of retaliation (mean of 7.57) than those who blew the whistle on waste 
(mean of 1.45).    
The final characteristic captured was the frequency with which a wrongful 
activity occurred. As shown in Table 2, there is no significant difference to be drawn 
between wrongdoing type and frequency of occurrence.   




The results indicate there is a significant relationship between the type of 
wrongdoing and whether an observer blew the whistle. The researchers also drew a 
significant relationship between the type of wrongdoing and the comprehensiveness of 
relation. However, analysis of the characteristics associated with each wrongdoing type 
does not paint a clear picture as to why. From this data, one may hypothesize that cost, 
quality of evidence, and probability of retaliation are the motivational factors that drive 
the whistleblowing decision. 
Wrongdoing pertaining to wastefulness serves as an example. Waste had the 
highest associated cost implications, the lowest rating for quality of evidence, the lowest 
comprehensiveness of retaliation, and highest observed instances. Waste was also the one 
of the least likely wrongdoing types to be reported when observed. This data suggests 
that lack of quality evidence may lead to nonreporting. 
There seems to be a direct correlation between quality of evidence and the 
probability that an observer will blow the whistle. Other legal violations and 
mismanagement were the two most-likely wrongdoing types to be reported, and these 
also carry the two highest ratings for quality of evidence. Sexual-harassment cases were 
the third-most-likely type to be reported by observers, and ranked fourth on the quality of 
evidence rating (trailing safety problems by 0.11). It is clear that quality of evidence 
plays a significant role in the decision process. 
The data provided insight as to where government organizations can focus 
whistleblower-policy efforts. For example, while a constrained budget is one of the 
greatest concerns for most government organizations and waste and safety violations 
carry large cost-avoidance potential, these offenses also rank mid to low on probability of 
being reported.    
3. Rewards and Legal Protections 
Dozens of federal and hundreds of state statutes provide whistleblowing 
protections and incentives, including monetary rewards (Feldman & Lobel, 2009). 
Reform of this legislation is continually undertaken to better incentivize those who step 
forward and report corporate or government wrongdoings. This section does not review 
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the legal intricacies of existing laws, but draws from actual cases and the literature to 
demonstrate how protection laws and monetary rewards may incentivize or frustrate a 
would-be whistleblower. 
a. Monetary Rewards 
The best known and arguably most successful tool ever for recovering U.S. 
taxpayer dollars, with results in the billions, is the FCA. As Senator Charles Grassley, R-
IA stated, “We need to send a clear message, from the very top of government, that 
whistleblowers who expose fraud against the federal government will receive rewards, 
not reprisals.”  This is the purpose of the FCA. Under the FCA (since the 1986 
amendments), the whistleblower may receive up to 30 percent of any judgment arising 
from a successful case and is afforded protection from retaliation (Carson, Vedru, & 
Wokutch, 2007). In fiscal year 2010 alone, over $3 billion was recovered under the FCA, 
and nearly 80 percent recovered as a direct result of whistleblower lawsuits (“False-
Claims Act Overview”, n.d.)         
In 1987, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) adopted a similar model that provides 
financial rewards for those who report tax evasion. Before expanding the Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006, the IRS was conservative as to rewards for whistleblowers. 
Only about 8 percent of whistleblowers were rewarded and the return was only 3–6 
percent of total tax-evasion recoveries (Ferzinger & Daniel, 1999). The 2006 
amendments provided an alternative mandatory-reward program for actions that exceed 
$2,000,000 and claims involving individual taxpayers whose income exceeded $200,000 
for the year in question (Feldman & Lobel, 2009). For claims that meet these criteria, 
whistleblowers were guaranteed 15–30 percent of the collected recovery, and a $10 
million reward cap was eliminated. By providing enhanced incentives, the number of 
whistleblower claims exploded from 50 submissions in 2007 to 472 in 2009 (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2012).   
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has implemented a similar 
reward system. Enacted under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1998, it 
draws upon other models, primarily the IRS’s, to increase successful prosecution against 
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insider trading (Feldman & Lobel, 2009). The SEC made its first award payment under 
the program in fiscal year 2012. The whistleblower was awarded 30 percent of an 
approximate $150,000 recovery by the end of the fiscal year (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2012). As of early 2014, the SEC whistleblower program has 
rewarded only a single whistleblower a total of nearly $50,000 in the 14 years since the 
program’s initiation. This is partly because, prior to amendments in 2011, the program 
was poorly incentivized. Reward compensation was capped at 10 percent and limited to 
penalties imposed under the act (whereas the FCA also permits rewards in qui tam 
lawsuits). Finally, SEC rewards were discretionary and not subject to judicial review, 
meaning that rewards were not guaranteed even if recovery was successful (Feldman & 
Lobel, 2009).   
b. Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Motivation 
Some experts theorize a downside to monetary rewards. Motivation is commonly 
defined as intrinsic—stemming from a moral foundation or sense of duty—or extrinsic—
motivated by external factors such as rewards (e.g., money) or consequences (e.g., fines). 
While some argue that extrinsic motivational factors can diminish the intrinsic motivation 
of an individual, others suggest that the two can be complementary (Bateman & Crant, 
2003). The theory of “crowding out,” as applied to regulatory incentives, suggests that 
when people attribute their actions to external rewards and punishments, the moral 
incentives for their behavior are discounted, thus lowering the power of intrinsic 
motivation. 
In 1999, Edward L. Deci conducted a study examining the effects of extrinsic 
rewards on intrinsic motivation. Through laboratory experiments, he found that tangible 
rewards undermine intrinsic motivation for a range of activities (Feldman & Lobel, 
2009). As a result of this research, Deci warns that attempts to influence an individual’s 
behavior through the use of external motivation may yield considerable long-term 
counterproductive results.   
To test the impacts of extrinsic, intrinsic, and combined motivational categories, 
Feldman and Lobel (2009) conducted an experiment with a potential (notional) 
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whistleblower scenario. Eight survey questionnaires were carefully developed and 
assigned to eight sub-groups of a sample group. The sample group comprised 2,081 
participants who constituted a representative panel based on U.S. census demographics. 
Each questionnaire contained different motivational and legal mechanisms. All 
participants were provided the same scenario, as follows: 
Imagine you are an employee of Roadblock LTD, one of the largest 
construction companies in the country. Roadblock has recently secured a 
fixed-price government contract to build a major highway in your city. 
One day, while staying late in the office, you run across a document that 
reveals that the company has been substituting lower grade and inferior 
quality parts from those specified in the contract. The document also 
reveals that the company has been omitting required testing and quality 
procedures. You estimate that as a result the government is overpaying 
your employer approximately $10,000,000 (Feldman & Lobel, 2009,  
p. 27) 
The participants were asked to predict their actions based on the scenario, given 
the motivational and legal mechanisms provided. The mechanisms were derived from 
Feldman and Lobel’s posited four leading incentive categories for reporting fraud: 
protection, duty, fine, and reward. The result identified eight categories of 
motivational/legal mechanisms that correspond to the eight different subgroups. The 
eight categories developed are as follows: 
 High Reward ($1,000,000) 
 Low Reward ($1,000) 
 Duty + High Reward 
 Duty + Low Reward 
 Anti-Retaliation Protection (1 Year) 
 Duty + Anti-Retaliation Protection 





Finally, after reviewing the scenario and the motivational/legal mechanism 
provided, the following variables were measured from each participant: 
 Intention of self and others to report 
 Evaluation of effect of the motivational/legal mechanism on the decision 
to report 
 Perceived morality, harm, and severity of the misconduct 
 Expected social and career ramifications 
 Organizational features and individual status 
 
The team found a significant difference among respondents as to how the 
morality, harm, and severity of the misconduct were perceived. As expected, those who 
provided the highest scores when judging the scenario as severe and immoral were more 
likely to report the incident than those who assigned lower scores. To further explore 
their findings, the research team divided the respondents into two categories: those who 
judged high severity and immorality and those who judged low. The first group can be 
considered more intrinsically motivated (high internal) and the second group can be 
considered as having lower levels of intrinsic motivation (low internal).   
The findings show a significant interaction between the type of motivational/legal 
mechanism and the perceived severity of the misconduct (see Figure 8). For the low-
internal group, those in the High-Reward, Duty + High Reward, and Duty + Fine 
categories were more likely than those in the Low-Reward category to report intent to act 
on wrongdoing observed. However, in reviewing the high-internal group, there is no 
significant impact from varying the motivational/legal mechanism. These findings 
suggest that for those who recognize a moral stake in an issue, external factor variances 
diminish in significance.     
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Figure 8.  Actions Taken against the Company by Self as a Function of the Legal 
Mechanism and Perceived Severity of the Misconduct  
(from Feldman & Lobel, 2009) 
The results shown in Figure 1 illuminate the impacts of internal and external 
motivational/legal mechanisms. External motivations seem to matter much more in the 
low-internal group. Those least likely to report wrongdoing were the low-internal group 
when offered a Low Reward. Low-Reward shows the largest variance between the two 
groups, while High-Reward showed the smallest. These findings suggest a crowding 
effect, wherein the external motivation seems to have a large impact on the moral 
dimension of reporting. Another important note is that this variance was less noticeable 
when examining fines and protections as categories. The researchers conclude that fines 
and protection as less likely to be perceived as external motivations and less likely to 
crowd out internal motivations.  Finally, the findings suggest that encouraging a sense of 
duty to report enhances the effect of severity on the whistleblower’s intention to inform. 
Combining duty (an internal motivation) with a high level of external motivation resulted 
in the highest level of reporting behavior.           
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c. Legal Protections 
The dilemma of the potential whistleblower is between doing right and suffering 
the consequences, or “swallowing the whistle” and pretending the offense does not exist 
(Rocha & Kleiner, 2005). Anti-retaliation protections under state and federal law are 
intended to encourage reporting. This section discusses legislation in a broad sense and 
assesses the impact protections have on the decision to report. 
Anti-retaliation protections have been pieced together from state and federal 
statutes and common-law exceptions to century-old “at-will” rules. At-will rules enable 
employers to terminate an employee “for good cause, for no cause, or even morally 
wrong cause.” (Feldman & Lobel, 2009)  Over the past 50 years, legislatures have 
strengthened laws that protect the employee from discharge. Among these is the right to 
report illegal wrongdoings without fear of retaliation. In the case of Ostrofe v H.S. 
Crocker Co. (1984), the court ruled that an employee could not be terminated for 
reporting the legal violations of an employer. The important takeaway was that while 
there were no anti-retaliation statutes in place, the court nevertheless ruled the case a 
wrongful termination. 
Besides internal and external motivations, Feldman and Lobel’s (2009) survey 
also explored how individuals responded to anti-retaliation protections versus other 
motivational/legal mechanisms. As seen in Figure 8, the subgroup offered the incentive 
of anti-retaliation legal protections for a year had an average likelihood of the 
respondent’s blowing the whistle, as compared to other incentives. Not much insight can 
be drawn from these results, but the researchers went a step further and examined the 
difference between genders as it applies to whistleblowing incentives. 
As seen in Figure 9, women are more likely to blow the whistle than men, overall 
(Feldman & Lobel, 2009). Gender differences are seen in the motivational factors that 
protections provide. Women were much more likely to blow the whistle when offered 
Duty + Protection and Protection than any other mechanism offered. These two 
mechanisms were also the largest difference between men and women. The important 
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suggestion from these findings is that men are more likely to be incentivized with a large 
financial reward, while women care much more about protection from retaliation.   
 
Figure 9.  Gender and the Effect of the Alternative incentive Mechanisms  
(from Feldman & Lobel, 2009)  
It can reasonably be assumed that a whistleblower is much more likely to inform 
knowing that he or she is protected by law against termination, demotion, harassment, 
and other forms of retaliation. The question arises as to why there was not a higher 
reporting level for that particular motivational mechanism in Feldman and Lobel’s 
results.  One explanation could be that today’s whistleblowers assume that protections are 
automatically granted under the ever-expanding rights of employees. Had the survey 
clarified that anti-retaliation protection was not covered by the other motivational/legal 
mechanisms provided, the results may have looked different.   
Legal anti-retaliation protections will always factor into the decision-making 
process. Results show that these protections provide the greatest incentive to women and 
one of the lowest incentives to men when deciding to report illegal activity in an 
organization.             
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B. DISINCENTIVES 
Whether or not a whistleblower enjoys legal protections does not mitigate the fact 
that most people would rather not blow the whistle. As the Army base study by Near, 
Rehg, Van Scotter, and Miceli (2004) showed, almost three quarters (74 percent) of 
people who witnessed some type of wrongdoing choose not to report it, a significant 
number. This section discusses the various reasons that people do not report wrongdoing, 
including fear of retaliation, rationalization that nothing will be done anyway, the time it 
takes for a wrongdoing to be exposed, potential delays in receiving financial rewards, and 
possible negative attention. 
1. Retaliation 
Through most of the 20th century, employees ideally worked for one company or 
organization for their entire career, earning their pensions and retiring to a nice life after 
30 years. Those days are long past. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports (2012) 
that the average person born in the latter years of the baby boom (1957–1964) held  
11.3 jobs from ages 18–46. Employee loyalty to one organization has all but vanished as 
corporations have merged, manufacturing jobs have diminished, and downsizing or right-
sizing have become commonplace. There was commonly an unspoken rule that no matter 
what an employee saw inside an organization, he would never make it public, even  
if the activity was unlawful or unethical (Rocha 2005). This expectation of company 
loyalty has been replaced by loyalty to society (Rocha 2005), whether in terms of 
environmentalism, public health, or safety issues. As social loyalty increases, witnesses 
to wrongdoing are more prone to speak out; but with speaking out comes the risk of 
reprisals, including dismissal, demotion, verbal harassment, shunning, poor appraisals, 
criminal investigation, job transfer, pressure to keep silent, browbeating over unrelated 
past offenses, and denial of training or educational opportunities (Devine, 2010; Near et 




Figure 10.  Percentage of Identified Whistleblowers Who Said they Experienced 
Retaliation (Top Ten) (from Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004)  
Retaliatory acts may be motivated by an organization’s desire to silence the 
whistleblower completely, prevent full public exposure of the complaint, discredit the 
whistleblower, or warn off other potential informers (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 
2005). Retaliation does not come from upper management alone. Some supervisors—
often without knowledge of upper management—will resort to retaliation to downplay a 
perceived loss of control in their department or personal influence, or to safeguard their 
position in the organization (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Table 3 lists 
















Table 3.   Predictors of Retaliation (from Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005)  




 More valuable to the 
organization (more 
loyalty expected) 
 Values of right and 
wrong not congruent 
with the organization 
 Younger  
 It is their job to blow 
the whistle (e.g., 
auditor) 
Actions Taken by the 
Whistleblower 
 External channels used 
 Unsuccessfully attempt 
to remain anonymous 
 Internal channels used 
 Actions are effective in 
curbing wrongdoing 
Contextual Variables  Lack of support from 
top management and 
supervisor 
 Coworker support not 
related to retaliation 
Characteristics of 
Wrongdoing 






 Multiple incidents, 
multiple individuals, 
multiple sources of 
evidence is unrelated to 
retaliation 
  
Retaliation often takes the form of damage inflicting on the whistleblower’s 
reputation. The “smokescreen syndrome,” as described by Devine (2010,) seeks to 
discredit the claimant by shifting attention to his motives, professional competence, 
values, personal life, finances, credibility, or any other vulnerability that may sideline the 
threat. For example, former Pentagon cost-control expert Ernie Fitzgerald endured 
repeated personal attacks as his life was probed by then-president Nixon’s investigators. 
More typical is retaliation in the whistleblower’s everyday work life, as in the case of 
Franz Gayl, a lifelong Marine—first as active duty and later as a civil servant—who was 
instrumental in blowing the whistle on U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) personnel who were 
not doing all they could to protect their own.   
As a science and technology advisor for the USMC in Iraq, Mr. Gayl witnessed 
deadly attacks on U.S. troops riding in flat-bottomed, high-mobility, multi-purpose 
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wheeled vehicles, or Humvees. These attacks from improvised, explosive devices (IEDs) 
led to hundreds of soldier casualties. As early as the mid-1990s, the Marine Corps knew 
that mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles provided at least four or five 
times more protection from injury or death as did armored Humvees (Gayl, 2009). In 
early 2005, commanders in the field requested, through an urgent universal-needs 
statement, an immediate fielding of MRAPs in Iraq. The USMC waited 19 months before 
finally agreeing to supply the MRAPs—this after a great many soldiers lost their lives in 
the less-protective Humvees. Mr. Gayl (2009) contends that officials knowingly delayed 
or refused to provide urgently requested capabilities like MRAP, as the requests 
competed against preexisting Quantico priorities for other armored vehicles that were 
known to be vulnerable (Devine, 2010). 
Just before his deployment to Iraq in 2006, Mr. Gayl brought the MRAP issue to 
his chain of command at the Pentagon, reporting that the decision-making process on the 
urgent request was not getting the attention it deserved. On his return stateside, a meeting 
was scheduled with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE) in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, though the DDRE had invited Mr. Gayl to 
report his findings, the invitation was cancelled by his superiors. Mr. Gayl was barred 
from any discussion of the problem, as communicated through written correspondence 
from management that effectively prohibited Mr. Gayl from any “outside communication 
on the matter” (Devine, 2010). Persisting, Mr. Gayl went to an external source: USA 
Today. After the newspaper published several stories on the delay in fielding the MRAPs, 
the secretary of defense, Robert Gates, took notice and made the MRAPs the top 
acquisition priority of the Department of Defense, which eventually ordered and fielded 
over 10,000 MRAP vehicles. 
The USA Today stories propelled Mr. Gayl into the limelight. Members of 
Congress, General David Petraus, the Naval Audit Service (NAS), the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), and the Department of Defense Inspector General all 
wanted to talk with him. These organizations agreed that the USMC had acted too slowly 
in responding to the IED threat when they had a solution in the form of the MRAP. 
USMC retaliation was relentless. For sustained periods, Mr. Gayl endured verbal 
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workplace harassment, assignments with termination threatened if not completed by 
unreasonable deadlines, and damaging performance evaluations, to name a few (Devine, 
2010). Perhaps the strongest retaliation was a 24-month delay in the renewal of Mr. 
Gayl’s security clearance. This came about even as the U.S. Office of Special Counsel 
blocked discipline on Mr. Gayl for disclosures to the inspector general and Congress, and 
in fact, obtained agreement for him to submit further disclosures as part of his job duties 
(Devine, 2010). The USMC searched for ways to find fault with Mr. Gayl in his work 
and seized upon a technicality when he failed to reference data that was unmarked, but 
later identified as classified (this was no fault of Mr. Gayl’s, as the USMC commanding 
general in Iraq had marked the material unclassified and approved). Throughout the 
investigation, the Marines did not disclose information to Mr. Gayl as to any charges, or 
why he was being investigated. The USMC inflicted further retaliation on Mr. Gayl 
denying opportunities for continuing education, a Congressional fellowship, and study at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. Additionally, when Mr. Gayl applied to and was accepted 
at a prestigious post-secondary university, the USMC denied him attendance, even 
though he paid for the schooling himself and agreed to be placed on leave without pay for 
the duration of his studies (Devine, 2010).   
The list of retaliations continues. After speaking at the National Whistleblower 
Assembly (a protected activity), his job description was rewritten, demoting him from a 
GS-15 to a GS-14. He was reinstated, but only after a key educational activity passed him 
by, because only GS-15 employees were eligible (Devine, 2010). The Marine Corps 
opened another investigation of Mr. Gayl through the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS), which failed to uncover any crimes. However, the probe did find one 
allegation: Mr. Gayl left a flash drive unattended in a classified area, an area Mr. Gayl’s 
supervisors left unsecured. Without further investigation into this allegation, the Marine 
Corps suspended his security clearance and placed him on indefinite leave without pay 
(Devine, 2010). 
With such harassment at risk, many potential whistleblowers choose not to get 
involved.  Fear of retaliation is a major disincentive to blowing the whistle, even when it 
might mean saving innocent lives. 
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2. Nothing Can or Will Be Done, So Why Report It?  
As cited in the Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, and Miceli (2004) study, 74 percent of 
persons who witness a wrongdoing choose not to report it. Important though fear of 
retaliation may be as a disincentive, the primary disincentive is less subtle. Of the over 
900 respondents who did not report an instance of wrongdoing, over half said the reason 
was that nothing could or would be done regarding the offense (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11.  Reasons For Not Reporting Wrongdoing  
(from Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004)  
Analysis of U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) statistics on whistleblower data from FY05–FY12 provides 
useful data in understanding this disincentive. During that period, OSHA made complaint 
determinations on over 16,500 whistleblower claims. The number of claims grew slightly 


























FY12 (“Record Number of Whistleblower Cases Filed,” 2013), suggesting that the 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 spurred more reporting. 
Statistically, the numbers would imply that the filing of more claims indicates 
more cases with merit, more recognition accorded to whistleblowers, and more monetary 
awards paid out (“False-Claims Act Overview”, n.d.). OSHA reports each complaint 
determination in one of five categories: merit, settled, settled–other, dismissed, and 
withdrawn. Table 4 shows the determination for each complaint and its category. 
Table 4.   Complaint Determination FY2005–2012  
(from U.S. Department of Labor, 2012) 
FY  Merit  Settled  Settled‐Other Dismissed Withdrawn
Total 
Determinations 
2005  41  269  87  1270  235  1902 
2006  23  284  117  1275  272  1971 
2007  18  261  112  1217  253  1861 
2008  21  328  95  1280  296  2020 
2009  58  277  116  1218  271  1940 
2010  44  309  135  1183  278  1949 
2011  55  399  156  1103  300  2013 
2012  45  405  187  1665  565  2867 
Total  305  2532  1005  10211  2470  16523 
%  1.8%  15.3%  6.1%  61.8%  14.9%  100.0% 
 
Note that while the total number of determinations increased by 42 percent from 
FY11–FY12, the number of those complaints that had merit decreased by 18 percent. 
Even more interesting is that, of all whistleblower cases, only a very small percentage 
were found to have merit and an overwhelming majority were dismissed outright, as 




Figure 12.  Complaint Determinations FY2005–2012 (after U.S. Department  
of Labor, 2012)  
OSHA frequently trumpets its successes in cases that have merit, when in 
actuality those cases are the exception, not the rule. When whistleblowers encounter 
statistics like those in Figure 12, they may become resigned, feeling it is no use reporting 
a wrongdoing. This research suggests that organizations should consider the data in a 
different way. If the number of reported wrongdoings skyrocketed in the last year, what is 
the reason (besides the enactment of the WPEA)—and how can it be used to an 
organization’s advantage?  The position promoted in this paper is that organizations can 
and should work with their employees to secure long-term benefits when a wrongdoing is 
encountered.  
3. A Long, Drawn-out Process 
When employees decide to blow the whistle, the decision is not made lightly, 













the time it takes to process a claim. The investigatory process, by its very nature, can be 
long. There are many variables to consider such as the whistleblower as an individual, the 
organizational culture, any accusations of reprisals, and the evidence or lack thereof. The 
realization that it may take a long time to process and investigate a claim could make a 
whistleblower reluctant to forward accusations, no matter meritorious the claim. To 
suggest the time commitment, three whistleblower programs in various organizations—
the U.S. Military, the SEC, and the IRS—are described below. 
a. The U.S. Military 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, “Whistleblower 
Protection: Actions Needed to Improve DoD’s Military Whistleblower Reprisal 
Program” (2012), observes, “DoD has generally not met statutory requirements to 
provide reports on completed investigations within 180 days of the date the allegation 
was made or alternatively, to provide notice to the complainant and the Secretary of 
Defense,” (2012, p. 13). The GAO discovered that although the DoD has made some 
attempt to shorten investigations, it has not consistently or accurately recorded key dates 
that would enable it to track how long the process takes to complete (2012). Without this 
data, the DoD is unable to identify areas for improvement or evaluate the effects of 
improvements made. 
Table 5 shows the speed of the investigative process and percentage of cases in 
which the DoD misses the mark of 180 days or less. 
Table 5.   Mean Case-Processing Time by Investigative Phase of Sampled 
Cases Closed between January 1, 2009 and March 31, 2011  
(from U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012)  
Investigative Phase Number Assessed Total Days (Mean) 
Percentage of Cases 
Over 180 Days 
All cases 91 451 (+/- 94 days) 70% (+/- 11%) 
Cases closed before 
full investigation 
61 469 64% (39 of 61 cases) 
Full investigation 28 395 82% (23 of 28 cases) 
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The GAO report reveals that besides failing to complete investigations in 180 
days in most cases, the DoD has failed to comply with the statutory reporting requirement 
by which notification is required for investigations beyond 180 days (2012). Without key 
timeliness data, the DoD is of course unable to provide chronological information or 
track and control the process (GAO, 2012). According to the GAO, data recorded in the 
“DoDIG’s (Department of Defense Inspector General’s) database understated the amount 
of days it took to close cases by a mean of 193 days” (GAO, 2012 p. 20). The clock was 
erroneously started when a clerk was assigned to the case and first opened it, as opposed 
to when the filer first provided the information to the DoDIG. 
Table 6 presents the discrepancy between what the DoDIG recorded in its 
database and what was actually happening.  
Table 6.   Timeliness Accuracy by Investigative Phase of Sampled Cases 
Closed between January 1, 2009 and March 31, 2011 (from U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2012) 












in the DoDIG 
database 
All cases 91 
258 (+/- 93 
days) 
451 (+/- 94 
days) 




61 271 469 




28 242 395 
25% (7 of 28 
cases) 
 
When it takes 75 percent longer to investigate a case than what is officially 
recorded, it is easy to see why time lags are a disincentive to prospective DoD 
whistleblowers. 
 50
b. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Section 21F, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection,” 
of the Dodd–Frank amendment to the Exchange Act enables the SEC to make monetary 
awards. An eligible individual must have voluntarily provided original information that 
led to successful SEC enforcement, resulting in the imposition of monetary sanctions of 
over $1,000,000 and certain related actions. During FY2012, the SEC made its first 
award under the whistleblower program (2012). In January 2013, the SEC Inspector 
General (SECIG) evaluated the SEC’s whistleblower program, including a review of 
promptness in responding to information provided and to award applications and how 
well the SEC communicated with interested parties (2013). 
The data available essentially gives raw numbers, including the average timeline 
for initial review, the average timeline for initial no-further-action (NFA) determination, 
the timeline for assigning a point of contact, and the percentage of tips, complaints, and 
referrals (TCRs) that were designated as NFA or as matters under inquiry (MUI) (SECIG, 
2013). 
As the SEC provides no analysis to accompany these raw figures and provide 
context, the SECIG has recommend that performance metrics be developed to determine 
appropriate response times: 
[T]here is no standard to determine whether the response time is prompt or 
not. Performance metrics are needed to strengthen the internal controls of 
the manual triage process. This is needed to ensure consistency in the 
SEC’s processes as new personnel are assigned to the office and as 
turnover occurs. A lack of performance metrics may result in the 
degradation of performance and pertinent to this review, unnecessarily 
long response times to whistleblower information. (SECIG, 2013, p. 17) 
Another area in which no performance metrics are present is in the time it takes 
for SEC Office of the Whistleblower personnel to send an acknowledgment or deficiency 
letter after a whistleblower submits an application for an award. Since there are no 
metrics in place, award applications may be delayed; and without a triggering 
mechanism, these applications may not be resolved in a timely manner. The SECIG 
concluded that the Office of the Whistleblower should use data collected on its key 
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performance measures to establish meaningful metrics for the performance of the 
whistleblower program (SECIG, 2013). 
Since the inception of the whistleblower award program two years ago, only two 
(relatively small) awards have been made, totaling $170,000 (Kelton, 2013). It may be 
too early to tell whether this unimpressive performance can be attributed to disincentive 
based on prolongation of the process.  
c. Internal Revenue Service 
The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the IRS to pay awards for information that 
leads to the detection and punishment of persons guilty of violating or conspiring to 
violate IRS laws. The IRS has had the authority to award whistleblowers for many years. 
In 1996, this ability was expanded, and ten years later, Congress passed the Tax Relief 
and Health Care Act of 2006, which set limits on awards as a percentage of collected 
proceeds but did not limit the maximum award payable. The opportunity to receive an 
award that is limited only as a percentage of collected proceeds resulted in an immediate 
increase in high-dollar claims submitted to the IRS, some alleging hundreds of millions in 
tax noncompliance (Treasury Inspector General, 2012). However, with this increased 
incentivizing of fraud reporting came a backlog of applications, investigations, and 
rulings, with which the IRS has dealt poorly. 
It can take years for an individual’s claim to work through the IRS reporting 
system. The GAO reported that as of April 2011, about 66 percent of claims submitted in 
the first two years of the program (fiscal years 2007 and 2008) were still in process 
(2011). After three or four years of filing a claim, two thirds remain in process. The 
situation may be exacerbated by IRS protocol.  The IRS reports that all claims go through 
a rigorous screening to ensure the integrity of claim reviews and taxpayer examinations. 
Additionally, taxpayers subject to examination can exercise their rights, which may add 
years to the process (GAO, 2011). Like the SEC, the IRS does not collect complete data 
on how long each step in the process takes or the reason a claim is rejected. Thus the IRS 
is not accountable to any standard by which to measure the program effectiveness. If 
nothing is measured, there is no way to improve; if there is no way to improve, claims 
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will continue to remain unresolved for years. The IRS uses the following steps in each 
whistleblower claim: 
1. Filing of whistleblower claim 
2. Initial review by whistleblower office (no time standard) 
3. Subject-matter-expert review (no time standard) 
4. Classification and examination 
5. Appeals and collections 
6. Period for taxpayer to exercise right to request refund 
7. Whistleblower office final review 
8. Award payment 
Both the Treasury Department IG report and the GAO report note that 
communications on whistleblower claims need to improve within and without the 
organization, as well as timeliness of resolution. The timeliness standards established by 
the IRS were adjudged as failing to provide uniform guidance in the processing of claims 
(Treasury Inspector General, 2012). For some reason, the IRS finds it difficult to include 
data on how long it takes to process whistleblower claims. In their 2010 annual report, 
the IRS gave the number of whistleblower claims and number of taxpayers those claims 
identified, but not data on the time required for claims to process or any specific 
information on rejected claims (2010). This lack of data limits Congress’s ability to 
oversee the program. Additional data could improve program transparency and encourage 
whistleblowers to come forward (GAO, 2011). 
It appears the IRS may be turning things around. Whereas in 2011 the first award 
was made on a claim first filed in 2006, late in 2012, several high-profile awards were 
announced (Jones, 2012). Possibly because of the Treasury IG and GAO reports, the IRS 
has implemented the following guidelines (IRS, 2013): 
 Claims should be initially evaluated by the whistleblower office within 90 
days. 
 Review by experts in IRS operating divisions and criminal investigation 
should be completed within 90 days of receipt from the whistleblower 
office. 
 Whistleblowers should be notified of an award decision within 60 days of 
when collected proceeds can be determined. 
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Despite this progress, waiting three, four, or even five years to collect on a claim 
can be a discouraging prospect. As yet another example disincentive, the IRS enforces 28 
percent tax withholding on all program awards (Saunders, 2014). This tax is exactly the 
opposite of what is needed to get witnesses to speak up when someone tries to 
circumvent the nation’s tax laws. 
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V. ANALYSIS  
Systems theory has proven an effective model for assessing organizational 
behavior (Millett, 1998). By treating an organization as a system, an analyst can discover 
complexities and subsystem connections that affect how the organization operates. In this 
chapter, the effects of having an established whistleblower policy (including training and 
processes) is analyzed, using an open-systems perspective model. 
A. OPEN-SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONAL-MODEL ANALYSIS 
Under a systems view, an organization is assessed as a set of interacting  
functions or subsystems that acquire inputs from the environment, transform them, and 
release them as outputs back to the external environment (Draft, 2001). An open-systems 
perspective views organizations as complex organisms that “live” in an external 
environment (McShane & Von Glinow, 2012). In other words, the system (or 
organization) is significantly influenced by its external environment, with which it 
exchanges inputs and outputs, both good and bad. This section explores how 
whistleblowing can affect an organization’s external environment, how that environment 
affects the organization, and as part of sound organizational design, a good 
whistleblowing policy and process can help an organization maintain equilibrium—that 
is, a healthy, normally operating, efficient state of being.  
In exploring whistleblowing within the government, evaluating the organization 
in question as an open-systems model can provide valuable insights. The starting 
assumption is that the external variables play a significant role in explaining what 
happens internally (Allen & Sawhney, 2010). Human organizations are normally 
described as “open” systems. Whereas closed systems have clear boundaries that define 
them regardless of external influences, the boundaries of open systems are permeable 
(Millet, 1998). A clock is a good example of a closed system: regardless of what else is 
happening, it continues to perform as designed. A government organization is much more 
complex and greatly influenced by surrounding government—thus an open-systems 
model is the logical choice for this research.    
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1. Organizational Model Description 
In assessing a government organization as an open system, a model developed by 
the Breckenridge Institute is useful in providing a graphic display of the organization as a 
starting point. The model version used in this research is customized slightly to 
demonstrate some key points. The following section describes the elements of the open-
systems model, as defined by the Breckenridge Institute (Breckenridge Institute, 2013).     
Figure 13 displays the structures and systems of an organization as a process-
oriented system that operates within an organizational climate or culture and influences, 
or is influenced, by the external environment, on which it depends for survival. 
According to the Breckenridge Institute,  
On the open systems view, organizations are like organic, living, goal-
seeking organisms where their structures and systems reach a state  
of equilibrium within context of their internal climate and the forces  
and pressures from business environment outside the organization 
(Breckenridge Institute, 2013). 
This idea of constantly seeking to reach or maintain equilibrium is key, as is the 
notion that everything within an organizational model is connected.   
There are three main elements in the organizational model in this research: 
strategic view, execution, and organizational climate. The strategic view defines the 
overall direction, goals, and objectives of an organization, and is a critical element of any 
organization. Inputs from the environment need to be interpreted and plans need to be 
established to execute organizational actions within an organizational climate. Note that 
the output from the strategic-view element sets the stage for the climate and execution 
elements of the organization.     
The elements necessary to execute a strategic view are reflected in the execution 
perspective. Within this view, all elements (decisions, people, processes, rewards, 
information, and structure) are interconnected. For example, having a formalized 
structure enables people to execute processes, make informed decisions, and be 
motivated by some sort of a reward.     
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Figure 13.  Breckenridge Institute Open Systems Organizational Model  
(from Breckenridge Institute, 2013) 
The final main element of the organizational model is the organizational climate. 
Loosely speaking, organizational climate is the experience of an employee on a day-to-
day basis, consisting of the underlying cultural norms of an organization. A good 
organizational climate is instrumental to higher employee satisfaction, better 
interpersonal relationships, and, as a consequence, higher productivity (Sahni & Kumar, 
2012). An organization’s climate is depicted as existing within the organizational 
boundary, but influenced by the external environment.    
Another key element in the open-systems model is the organizational boundary, 
or what separates thane organization from other social entities. These boundaries can take 
many shapes and forms, including the physical (e.g., a building or location), time-related 
(work shifts or time zones), social (hierarchies and discipline), language (industrial or 
national), and cultural (shared beliefs, values, and stereotypes). Organizational 
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boundaries in an open-systems model are permeable to the external environment. The 
degree of permeability is important for controlling forces from the external environment 
and enabling the organization to reach equilibrium. Control must be deliberately designed 
and monitored by leadership. 
The external environment is quite simply, everything outside the organizational 
boundary. An organization must interact with the external environment to survive. 
Customers, suppliers, and competitors are three common external elements that directly 
influence an organization. Much of the information available in the external environment 
is irrelevant to the organization and provides no added value; thus, inputs must be filtered 
by management. While every organization receives external inputs and returns outputs, it 
is important to understand that the external environment can be influenced, but not 
controlled.              
All organizations have a purpose or need to exist. To survive, an organization 
must align its vision and goals with tangible needs that occur in the external environment, 
and the organization’s purpose becomes meeting these needs. The output (or strategic 
plan) from the strategic view in Figure 13 should guide the organization toward fulfilling 
its purpose in the external environment. 
The open-systems model provides two feedback loops: the tactical and strategic. 
Tactical feedback can be thought of as business results. It describes how well an 
organization is meeting its defined goals by measuring the results produced (financial and 
otherwise). Strategic feedback, on the other hand, indicates how well the organization is 
aligned with its purpose of meeting needs in the external environment.        
2. Whistleblowing-Event Analysis without Internal Policy 
For demonstration purposes, a governmental acquisition organization is assessed 
below, in which a whistleblower event occurs. It is assumed that the organization has no 
internal policy for reporting fraud or observed wrongdoings. To analyze the 
whistleblowing event from an open-systems perspective, we explore the actual 
experience of an employee in the execution section of the organizational model. As 
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shown in Figure 14, the output generated by the organization does not follow its designed 
path.   
 
Figure 14.  Open-Systems Organizational Model (after Breckenridge Institute, 
2013)  Whistleblowing Event without Internal Policy 
In an uncontrolled external whistleblowing event, the flow of information across 
the organizational boundary to the external environment (output) is outside the 
organization’s control. As often seen in whistleblowing cases, the individual(s) went 
directly to the external environment to report a wrongdoing in lieu of following policy 
and process. This action signals a breakdown of organizational design. The 
organizational boundary is permeable from an open-systems perspective, but the border 
must be controlled for an organization to reach equilibrium and efficient performance. 
Before examining the effect a whistleblowing can have on an organization, let us first 
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explore the organizational-design problems that may have allowed the uncontrolled 
situation in the first place.    
Upon further examination of the organization’s execution element, several 
interconnected sub-elements are revealed: decisions, people, structure, processes, 
information, and rewards. In this model, it is easy to visualize how organizational 
decisions can impact the structure and the persons within it. If no decision was ever made 
to design and promote a whistleblower program, there may be no structure to support 
such an activity, nor would the right people be in positioned to develop, sustain, and act 
upon it. Thus the cascading impacts of each single sub-element are apparent. Without a 
supportive structure for whistleblowing, the processes needed to empower a would-be 
whistleblower would not exist, information would not be communicated (e.g., through 
training), and of course, there would be no reward as an incentive. Every decision sub-
element is therefore equally critical—carrying equal weight, they together constitute the 
execution element as a whole.   
The precursor to the execution element is the strategic view in the open-systems 
model. The strategic view, developed by leadership, establishes overall direction and sets 
the stage for how an organization executes in its external environment. In this example, 
whistleblowing was not captured at a strategic level, hence not captured as a leadership 
focus area. Therefore, no policy was developed to support its execution. It becomes easy 
to see how the execution element spun out of control in the whistleblowing event. 
Without the strategic foresight to anticipate (or encourage) and manage such an event, the 
employee is more likely to create unmanageable outputs to the external environment. 
Now let us explore the external environment of the open-systems model before an 
external whistleblowing event. In an open system, inputs are received as tactical and 
strategic feedback. In this example, we focus on strategic feedback, which is described as 
business context. Leaders must understand the social, cultural, and political expectations 
of the organization and develop a strategic view to accommodate them. A government 
organization in the United States is entrusted with taxpayer money. American taxpayers 
make up an extremely large community of stakeholders; therefore, it is critical to exercise 
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good stewardship of taxpayer funds if the organization means to stay intact and provide a 
service to the country.   
In the example provided, an external whistleblowing event caused an uncontrolled 
output to the external environment. Let us return to a case previously referenced, wherein 
Mr. Gayl blew the whistle by going direct to USA Today. In today’s society, the media  
is a critical component of the external environment, with which communication must  
be controlled. Mr. Gayl’s uncontrolled external output created severe unwanted 
consequences for the USMC. This resulted in new inputs, which shifted the 
organization’s attention from its primary mission to managing increased media attention, 
congressional oversight and testimonies, litigation, and mistrust from key stakeholders.                    
3. Whistleblowing-Event Analysis with a Designed Internal Policy 
An organization with a deliberate organizational design to address or encourage 
whistleblowing is in a much better position of control. As noted, controlling information 
flow between an organizational boundary and the external environment is critical to 
operating with any sort of efficiency.    
As organizations draw inputs from the external environment to operate, they also 
create outputs to the external environment, which creates a feedback loop. As a central-
control mechanism for maintaining balance between order and chaos (Millett, 1998), the 
feedback loop becomes an input to strategy and execution. As demonstrated in Figure 14, 
an organization without a deliberate whistleblowing policy can lose control, and the 
ensuing chaos may decrease operational effectiveness.   
All government organizations have many inputs from the external environment, 
but this analysis focuses specifically on social, cultural, and political expectations and the 
strategies that ensure these expectations are met. Good stewardship of taxpayer money is 
one key expectation. Because fraud is everywhere, a government organization must have 
means to identify and address wrongdoing to fulfill its stewardship function.   
Once an input is understood, it needs to be interpreted within the strategic view of 
the organizational model (reference Figure 13). Senior leaders of the organization 
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understand that fraud can happen; thus they must be prepared to handle it. This 
realization creates leadership focus, which enables the development of policies to address 
whistleblowing, allocates resources in support of policy development, and identifies the 
strategic talent required. Finally, plans for deploying the policy are made. All the 
elements identified in the strategic view must be addressed to enable successful 
management of a potential whistleblowing event.   
Once a strategic view is established, it must be communicated to enable the 
execution element of the organizational model. For successful management of potential 
whistleblowing events, each sub-element must be addressed and assessed for interactions. 
Most organizational decisions are delegated to managers at lower levels than those who 
establish the strategic direction. Again, the sub-elements should direct these decisions 
towards a common goal of finding ways to manage whistleblowing events and maintain 
control. These lower-level decisions will affect how structure and processes are 
developed to report, monitor, and control whistleblowing cases. When developing 
process and structure, leaders must also understand what type of reward (incentive) will 
appeal to employees within the organization. The final step is to provide the required 
information to all personnel as to how whistleblowing can and will be received.  
Applying systems theory, utilizing an open systems model of an organization, 
offers many insights into organizational behavior during a whistleblowing event.  
Organizational leadership can use this as a tool to assess the complexities of the many 
interconnected subsystems within the organizational boundary.  By doing do so, 
adjustments can be made to address gaps in the strategic or execution areas of the 
organization to effectively enable and control whistleblowing events.    
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VI. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. A DELIBERATE/TAILORED WHISTLEBLOWING POLICY 
Wherever the fraud triangle of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization exists, 
fraud will happen.  There are several institutional vehicles for reporting fraud, including 
audits, the Defense Contract Management Agency, Federal Acquisition Regulations, and 
inspector-general investigations.  One of the most valuable methods, though infrequently 
captured by program managers, is whistleblowing (Pierson, Forcht, & Bauman).  PMs 
can use information provided by internal employees to make their organizations more 
efficient, transparent, and financially and ethically sound, and to yield a better workplace 
overall. 
To secure these results, PMs must adopt an attitude of openness, address and 
investigate allegations of wrongdoing, correct bad policies, depersonalize the process, 
and implement an internal whistleblowing program for the benefit of the employee and 
organization.  The following recommendations require changes in the organizational 
model, including an internal-feedback loop and an external-output mechanism.  Finally, a 
strategy on how to implement and execute a deliberate whistleblowing strategy is 
presented. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL-MODEL RECOMMENDATIONS 
To develop a whistleblowing policy for a program office, this research 
recommends beginning with an open-system organizational model such as that of the 
Breckenridge Institute.  Graphically displaying the interconnected subsystems within the 
organization is a first step to ensuring that all required connections and interdependencies 
are acknowledged and addressed.   
Two alterations to the organizational model are recommended.  First and most 
important is implementation of an internal-feedback loop; second is an external-output 
mechanism for would-be whistleblowers, to avoid uncontrolled release of information to 
the external environment.  
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1. The Internal-Feedback Loop 
An internal-feedback loop from execution to the strategic-view element, as shown 
in Figure 15, will essentially inform senior leaders as to how the organization is 
executing their strategy before generating outputs to the external environment. Internal-
feedback loops give several benefits. First, they are essential control mechanisms, 
allowing leaders to assess how well the whistleblower policy is working, adjust strategy 
if necessary, and intervene in the execution element if something appears to be broken.  
Second, internal-feedback loops foster a healthy organizational climate. By listening to 
employee feedback and actively ensuring that strategy is aligned with personnel needs, 
leaders improve organizational climate; if employees are trust that their senior leaders 
will fully support the whistleblowing policy, they are much more apt to feel they can 
make a difference and more likely to report wrongdoing. Overcoming any perception that 
“nothing could be done about it” is critical, as a sense of pessimism is the primary reason 
offenses go unreported. The emplacement of an internal-feedback loop encourages 
employee confidence in leadership commitment to follow-through and openness to 
change. 
While incorporation of an internal-feedback loop offers better control and may 
improve the organizational climate, it does not cover the organization’s entire need.  
When senior leadership is accused of a wrongdoing or ignoring a problem, the 
whistleblower must have ways to report the issue to the external environment, but via a 














Figure 15.  Open Systems Organizational Model (after Breckenridge Institute, 2013) 
with Internal-Feedback Loop  
2. Controlled External-Output Mechanism 
As seen in the example of whistleblower Franz Gayl, an uncontrolled external 
output created severe and unwanted consequences for the USMC. Mr. Gayl attempted 
several times to report to his chain of command (an internal process) and his motions 
were dismissed by his superiors.  When a whistleblower is rebuffed, he has two options.  
He may drop the issue, like the 74 percent of employees cited above (Near et al., 2004), 
or he may bypass the chain of command and present his case to receptive parties in the 
external environment.  Mr. Gayl chose to bypass the chain of command, but had no 
external process to follow.  He therefore took it upon himself to report the observed 






Figure 16.  Open-Systems Organizational Model (after Breckenridge Institute, 
2013) with Internal-Feedback Loop and Controlled-External Output  
To avoid such uncontrolled external reporting, it is recommended that program 
managers develop a way for would-be whistleblowers to bypass their chain of command 
if needed.  The organization should contract with a third party to collect whistleblowing 
outputs and relevant information and provide a feedback loop to organizational 
leadership.  Figure 16 displays how a third party can collect organizational output and 
provide feedback (represented by a red arrow) as an input.  The purpose of this design is 
to allow a prospective whistleblower to bypass chain of command, remain anonymous if 
desired, and still notify the PM leadership team of alleged fraud or wrongdoing.  This 
gives organizational leadership—not just one person, but all key leaders—the ability to 
investigate, mitigate risks, find a solution, and prepare for consequences if and when the 
information goes public.   
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In the event leaders disregard the reported fraud or wrongdoing, the third party 
should have means to take its findings directly to the external environment (represented 
by the dotted blue line in Figure 16), and  the PM office must provide clear and concise 
criteria under which the third party is authorized to do so.  This mechanism is crucial to 
ensuring the integrity of the policy when management itself is the alleged culprit. 
Another key benefit to using a third party is that it can collect inputs from the 
external environment for the PM office (represented by the green line in Figure 16).  
These external whistleblowing inputs could come from service organizations, defense 
contractors, or any other channel outside the PM office and be collected, organized, and 
communicated via the feedback loop to organizational leaders for further action.               
The proposed changes in organizational design are intended to control the 
external output of fraud or wrongdoing and thus enable leadership to eliminate or correct 
the risk internally, with minimal damage to the organization.  To accomplish an effective 
whistleblowing policy, the PM office must focus on the strategic and executional views 
of the organization.          
C. STRATEGY 
One prerequisite in the development of an internal whistleblowing strategy is 
strong endorsement from upper management.  Employee awareness and empowerment 
rises when leaders take a strong stance on whistleblowing, implementing a conducive 
strategy from the top down and promulgating it throughout the organization.  A written 
whistleblower policy is vital.  PMs must produce a formal policy with a well defined role 
and purpose, containing clear information on what should be reported, how it should be 
reported, and to whom. One or more mechanisms must be provided by which employees 
can report offenses—for example, an independent third party to hear complaints or a 
senior-level champion in charge of the program.  Potential mechanisms are described 
further below.       
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1. Leadership Focus 
The ethics and culture of an organization flow from the top down and are revealed 
through policies, procedures, and the example set by executive officers.  A clear 
connection needs to exist between an organization’s code of ethics and its performance 
measures.  Leaders need to treat whistleblowing as the moral obligation of everyone, 
from CEO to new intern, and PMs need to cultivate an environment where downward and 
upward communication is encouraged.  The open-door message must be promoted by 
program managers and supervisors at all levels.  Individuals will more likely take 
advantage of whistleblowing mechanisms if they know their voices will be heard.  The 
PM must affirm his commitment to the whistleblowing policy whenever appropriate and 
publically acknowledge and reward employees who raise ethical concerns (subject to 
their permission).  Program managers must also clearly communicate to subordinates the 
following information: 
 The program manager’s overall stance on fraud 
 Examples of what fraud is 
 How fraud can harm the organization 
 The importance of reporting suspected improprieties 
 How to make a report 
 The necessity of ensuring anonymity 
 What happens after a report is made 
 What to do if a supervisor or senior leader is suspected 
 Assurance that all reports will be considered seriously and investigated 
promptly 
The latter point is very significant to employees, who are typically anxious that 
allegations be investigated thoroughly yet quickly.  They must also feel confident that 
any results from the investigation will be reported by their immediate supervisors to a 
higher authority.   
Many reports of fraud come from outside the program manager’s office; 
accordingly, vendors, contractors, and employees of other DoD agencies should also be 
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made aware of whistleblowing policies.  Readily available, effective training will enable 
employees to identify exactly what fraud is, how to recognize it, and how to report it.    
2. Policy Development 
An organization’s commitment to whistleblowing is set forth in its formal policy. 
The PM’s fraud-reporting program should have a clearly defined scope and purpose, and 
controls and procedures for processing allegations must be clearly understood. The very 
existence of a formal policy signals to employees that eliminating fraud is an important 
goal of the organization and instills confidence that whistleblower information will be 
handled well.  The policy serves as a reference guide, describing how the system works, 
the roles and responsibilities of each person in the process, how reports are assessed, how 
investigations proceed, what happens after an investigation, and the kinds of protections 
in place.  At minimum, the following definitions must be clear:  
1) What is a whistleblower 
2) The type of fraud to report 
3) Protections available to the whistleblower 
The policy must also list clear steps for reporting wrongdoing and specifically 
indicate who handles whistleblower complaints, with the role and responsibilities of this 
party.   
This research recommends that an external, independent party be contracted to 
receive information. A third party can offer expertise not usually available internally, 
allay whistleblower anxiety, and receive external output in a way that will not damage the 
institution. A controlled external-output mechanism, whether a tipster hotline, website, 
walk-in office, or mailing address, both encourages the whistleblower and benefits top 
management by providing a way to learn of the alleged problem, investigate, and prepare 
to deal with the outcome. 
A good policy should also specify a person charged to look after the welfare of 
the whistleblower.  Reprisals from colleagues or middle management can occur even in 
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organizations with strong whistleblower policies.  If employees know that top 
management will shield them, they may feel more comfortable coming forward. 
A whistleblower policy should explain how fraud data is collected, reported, and 
stored within the organization.  This data should never contain elements that might 
compromise confidentiality; few employees would speak out, especially with serious 
allegations, if information were not held extremely close.   
How an investigation is conducted, who is involved, and actions taken after the 
investigation are of great interest to potential reporters, and should be detailed in the 
formal policy. The whistleblower also needs to see how he will be kept informed and 
what to do if adverse action is taken or if he himself is accused of wrongdoing.  The 
accused employee is also an important party in a whistleblowing scenario, and the policy 
must also cover how his rights are protected, including the right to know what is being 
investigated, to respond to allegations, and to protect his identity. 
3. Resources   
A whistleblower policy may be all encompassing and every aspect of the program 
may be documented, but that does not guarantee smooth implementation.  Along with 
top-management commitment and a well-considered policy is a need for resources to 
implement the policy and create a reward structure. 
Just as a weapon system needs dollars for personnel, hardware, training, and 
sustainment, a whistleblower program requires financial support from program managers. 
The PM’s program is an investment that will pay off as illegal and fraudulent acts are 
reported —but there are up-front and continuing costs.   
The resources needed include, in the first place, personnel to write a 
comprehensive policy.  The PM may be able to use the human-resource department, 
though many times he must pay for this matrix resource.  In addition, costs such as 
training and setting up reporting vehicles must be accommodated.   
A program manager often has little latitude to divert funding towards a reward 
system for whistleblowers.  In the FCA, IRS, and SEC whistleblower programs, rewards 
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are paid from funds collected through enforcement; while PMs should be aware of these 
programs and provide information to all potential whistleblowers, there are other ways to 
reward an individual that may be within the PM’s power. 
D. EXECUTION 
Once management has developed a whistleblowing strategy, it is time to execute 
it. Here all the elements of fraud management come into play: preventive, detective and 
corrective controls over the five primary considerations (process, people, decisions, 
information, and rewards) to reduce the fraud triangle of pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalization.   
1. Process  
It is vital that the whistleblowing process not be seen by the workforce as an 
added burden on their duties. Using a third party as recommended will keep staff time 
commitments to a minimum. The third party should conduct audits of every PM process 
to ensure that employees are working correctly and honestly. As a vital part of detective 
control, these external audits should happen by surprise, to give fraudsters less chance to 
hide their actions and auditors more chance to discover them. Surprise audits are also a 
preventive control, providing disincentive and helping reduce opportunity. Besides 
external audits, internal audits by a team of handpicked representatives from every major 
process in the organization should be held. Senior leadership should provide enough 
resources and authority to the team that they are taken seriously and can operate without 
intervention from the top. Auditing software may be used to supplement the audits, 
especially in financial areas. The use of such software should be known to the workforce 
so it can function as a deterrent–but it should be run and maintained by a third party to 
keep its operation opaque. The auditing software should be included in policy 
development and testing as a good way to identify vulnerabilities to internal or external 
fraud. 
The PM should maintain a proper separation of duties among employees to reduce 
perceived opportunities to commit fraud. Thus, the person receiving and verifying 
purchases should not be the same as the person who approves or places the order. The 
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financial team should be structured so that one person’s work double-checks another’s. 
No single person should have access or authority to complete a financial transaction 
alone, nor should the person conducting an inventory of PM-owned assets be responsible 
for their safekeeping and operational use. 
The process must provide potential whistleblowers with options. Every individual 
should potentially feel comfortable with at least one way of providing tips, whether 
directly, through a supervisor, externally, through a third-party partner, or through a 
website—with anonymity always a clear option.   
All tips should be investigated quickly and the results should be available to the 
workforce. The fraud prevention and whistleblower process will be significantly more 
effective if the workforce receives regular feedback and updates on the process. To catch 
trends that may reveal systemic problems, a database should be created.  
2. People 
The PM should keep employees invested, from training to outcomes. As noted, 
upper management must set the proper climate and tone at the top. Employees should not 
only hear their leaders condemn fraud, they must see honesty and integrity in action. 
Fraud-policy communications should be sent to the workforce directly from upper 
management, and management should present fraud information on a monthly basis. 
To reduce the pressure side of the fraud triangle, management should set realistic 
work-performance goals for employees—they should be challenged to excel, but not 
stretched to the breaking point. Unachievable goals lead to bitterness and overworked 
employees become stressed, never receive the satisfaction of meeting goals, and endure 
gratuitous pressure. As a preventative, employees should be encouraged to use their 
annual leave to reduce stress levels and coworkers should be cross-trained to handle the 
responsibilities of employees on leave, so as to prevent their stressful return. Cross-
training allows an organization to run efficiently in case of sickness or other absence as 
well and, key to issues of fraud, makes coworkers familiar with normal behavior, 
processes, and actions in other areas within the PM. Something out of the ordinary can 
thus be more readily identified and brought to a supervisor’s attention.  
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A healthy work environment conduces to happy, relaxed employees; but there is 
always the possibility that the personal circumstances of an employee may become a 
source of major stress. The PM should be cognizant of behavioral changes in employees 
and recognize destructive behaviors. For issues of addiction, mental and emotional 
health, family problems, or financial issues, the PM should be versed in the range of state 
and federal support programs that may be available and encourage him to seek help, 
offering mentoring as appropriate.  
The PM should arrange independent, anonymous, third-party surveys to 
determine the extent to which employees feel management acts honestly and responsibly. 
The survey should capture employee morale and solicit suggestions on improving morale. 
Management should review these surveys and provide a summary, along with a list of 
actions taken to address identified concerns.  
Fraud-prevention goals should be incorporated into a manager’s annual 
performance goals to expedite progress and demonstrate upper leadership’s commitment 
to fraud prevention. Managers must operate under a true open-door policy, so that 
employees feel comfortable approaching their supervisors with concerns and feelings of 
pressure. This allows management to deal with difficulties in their infant stage, before 
they grow and possibly spread within the organization.  
3. Decisions 
The need for decision making comes into play primarily in the area of corrective 
controls. Once a fraud has been reported or a fraudster identified, the PM needs to decide 
how to handle the situation. Since fraud takes many forms, from foisting of unsafe 
military equipment to siphoning of millions of dollars, the PM must determine 
individually how best to handle each case.  
The PM must not be ashamed, timid, or complacent when dealing with fraudsters. 
The PM must show zero tolerance towards fraud and set the right tone by acting in an 
official capacity and involving outside authorities. If the fraudster worked within the 
organization, he should be removed. Law enforcement should be informed, civil action 
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should be taken, and regulatory authorities should be notified. A slap on the wrist or, 
worse, no action at all, sends a cynical message that defeats the concept of zero tolerance. 
When there is no conclusive evidence of fraud, a formal written warning or 
reprimand should be given, or both. A note should be made in the employee’s permanent 
record, which will provide background should another allegation be made.  If the 
fraudster works outside the organization, the PM should cease involvement with any 
business or organization he is associated with. 
The PM will not necessarily have, and should not pretend to have, legal authority 
to handle all the issues that whistleblowers may bring to light. Thus the importance of 
retaining a third-party organization to handle cases beyond the PM’s domain, in which 
federal or state organizations must be invoked.  
4. Information 
Having designed an outstanding whistleblower policy and supported it with 
resources, the PM’s next task is to communicate the policy to employees. If the 
individuals for whom the system is intended remain ignorant of its existence or unsure 
how it works, the PM’s efforts are in vain. The information element in the organizational 
model is a combination of preventive and detective controls. Employees need preventive 
notification and training, and, should they become aware of an offense, information on 
how to notify management through established detective controls. 
 The PM should begin by ensuring that all managers and supervisors, from the top 
and working down, are fully trained in and committed to the whistleblowing policy. As 
previously referenced, an organization needs robust buy-in from upper management. 
Once management is comfortable with the new policy, they must introduce it to their 
employees in a simple, easy-to-digest manner. Training should be conducted by manager 
in person, not pushed out as a mandatory online-training module. The training should 
explain what the PM considers fraud and emphasize zero tolerance for wrongdoing, 
whether internal or external. 
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At minimum, employees should walk away knowing where they can seek further 
information and obtain help in reporting possible offenses. They should know they may 
speak freely without fear of reprisal and that there are procedures to report either 
internally or externally. 
The PM should hang posters communicating zero tolerance and hotline 
information. Any changes to the policy should be distributed in a concise and timely 
manner, and fraud statistics, including updates, number of tips, and actions taken, should 
be readily available to demonstrate that management is taking real action. While the 
PM’s efforts towards communication are the most voluminous and open, the tips and 
information the employees may return to the PM are the main objective of this 
communicative element.  
5. Rewards 
Tips are consistently and by far the most common fraud-detection method used by 
employees (Ratley, 2014), accounting for more than 42 percent of frauds detected (see 
Figure 5). The PM must set up easy-to-use hotlines and encourage employees to use 
them. Not everyone is a golden citizen willing to go out of his way to blow the whistle. 
For this reason, PMs should offer rewards for whistleblowers, within the program’s 
means. A government organization is somewhat limited in its ability to offer monetary 
rewards, but paid leave, VIP parking, and flexible work schedules may be considered. 
The PM’s internal team and third-party whistleblower representative must stay up 
to date on federal and state incentives so as to leverage new and existing statutes to their 
advantage. The PM should provide guidance on how to tap into these programs, which 
generally offer much larger cash rewards—up to 30 percent of recovered damages from 
the FCA, 15 to 30 percent from the IRS, and the 10 to 30 percent of total monetary value 
reclaimed from the SEC. 
An extrinsic reward such as cash may not be needed to convince certain 
employees; those with a strong sense of moral duty are likely to report fraud without 
expectation of gain. To achieve the greatest probability of reportage, PMs should 
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combine an external motivator such as cash with a healthy work environment that honors 
duty and responsibility. 
While some fraud is inevitably found wherever human beings conduct 
transactions, much can be done to reduce occurrences and encourage healthy 
whistleblowing through simple but emphatic and widely understood policies. The U.S 
government has a fiduciary duty to its stakeholders, the American people, to pursue such 
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